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Policies designed to reduce U.S. petroleum consumption increasingly promote mar-
kets for ethanol and other biofuels through subsidies, mandates, and funding for research.
Many policymakers argue that substituting toward biofuels will enhance national energy
security, reduce carbon dioxide emissions, mitigate local air and water quality impacts as-
sociated with petroleum refining and consumption, and benefit domestic farmers. Many re-
cent policies mandate, either explicitly or implicitly, a minimum market share for ethanol.
A prime example is the federal renewable fuels standard, which requires a minimum quan-
tity of renewable fuel in the nation’s fuel supply. Despite this attention from policymak-
ers, relatively little is known about household preferences for biofuels or how expanded
markets for these fuels might operate. Such information is critical for designing, imple-
menting, and evaluating policies to promote ethanol and other biofuels.
In chapter II of this dissertation, I address this important research need by estimating
demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute. I find that demand for ethanol is sensitive to
relative fuel prices, with elasticities that average from 2.5–3.0. These are the first avail-
able estimates in the literature for the price elasticity of household ethanol demand, which
is a critical parameter for studies that analyze a retail ethanol subsidy or mandate. Price
responses are substantially smaller and less variable than they would be if household pref-
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erences for ethanol were identical or nearly identical, and fuel-switching behavior extends
over a wide range of prices where ethanol is discounted 0%-25% below gasoline. This
implies that household preferences for ethanol are diffuse.
These results have important implications for policy. Previous economic analyses of
government interventions that promote ethanol assume that household preferences are
identical and depend exclusively on ethanol’s fuel economy performance relative to gaso-
line (Holland et al. 2007). This assumption can yield misleading results if households also
value ethanol for its perceived environmental and social benefits. I find that preferences
for ethanol as a gasoline substitute vary dramatically, with some households exhibiting a
marked preference for ethanol. Households with particularly strong preferences represent
“low-hanging fruit” that can be induced to purchase ethanol with less severe distortion of
market prices. Accounting for this heterogeneity reduces the economic efficiency costs
of an ethanol content standard (i.e., a minimum market share requirement) by as much as
50% relative to previous studies, which incorrectly assume identical preferences. Similar
intuition likely applies for policies that promote other “green” substitutes, such as renew-
able electricity, energy-efficient light bulbs and appliances, hybrid vehicles, and organic
foods.
I begin my analysis by developing a model of household utility with inputs of ethanol
and gasoline. These inputs are perfect substitutes in producing household transportation
services. The key parameter in this model is the relative price at which the household is in-
different between relying entirely on either fuel. When this parameter varies continuously
among households, aggregate demand for ethanol is a smooth function of relative fuel
prices. The model formalizes the link between the distribution of household preferences
for ethanol and the response of aggregate demand to changes in relative fuel prices. This
allows me to recover the distribution of household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline
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substitute from observed price responses. The model also distinguishes price responses
associated with fuel switching from those associated with changes in overall fuel demand.
I estimate the model using a unique dataset that contains more than 5000 monthly obser-
vations for ethanol prices and sales volumes at nearly 240 individual retail fueling stations
during 1997–2006. These data provide a rare opportunity to document household prefer-
ences for biofuels, whose market shares have generally been too small to warrant inclusion
in household surveys or to be reported separately from gasoline in aggregate measures. I
use these data to estimate demand for ethanol as a function of ethanol prices and gasoline
prices. Consistent with my theoretical model, which implies that price elasticities might
vary dramatically, I allow aggregate ethanol demand to be a flexible function of relative
fuel prices in my empirical specification. Previous empirical studies of demand for alter-
native fuels and gasoline varieties with close substitutes do not allow for this important
flexibility.
I use the distribution of household preferences implied by my estimates to simulate
the effects of a national ethanol content standard for gasoline. I find that a 25% ethanol
content standard would decrease gasoline consumption by 21% and would cut carbon
dioxide emissions from gasoline by 12% at an annual economic efficiency cost of about
$50 billion. Efficiency losses derive primarily from ethanol’s higher marginal cost. The
ethanol content standard is costly relative to benefits, even after accounting for heterogene-
ity. Costs average about $370 per metric ton of carbon dioxide emissions avoided, which
is several times higher than even pessimistic estimates of marginal external damages, or
about $1.90 per gallon of gasoline saved, which is well beyond reasonable estimates for
the external cost associated with petroleum dependence. These results may understate the
costs of the ethanol standard, as I do not account for impacts on food prices and as recent
studies indicate that ethanol may actually increase carbon dioxide emissions.
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The empirical economic literature on demand for biofuels is miniscule.1 While an
immense literature estimates demand for gasoline, the vast majority of studies focus on the
response of overall fuel demand to changes in fuel price levels. Because households have
relatively few transportation alternatives, fuel demand in the short run is price inelastic.2
This analysis in contrast focuses on fuel-switching behavior and how demand for ethanol
as a gasoline substitute responds to changes in relative fuel prices. Because households
that purchase ethanol are able to substitute easily between ethanol and gasoline, demand
for ethanol is price elastic.
Within the transportation fuel demand literature, this analysis is most similar to studies
that estimate demand for particular fuels with close substitutes, including full-service and
self-serve gasoline (Phillips and Schutte 1988) and regular and premium gasoline in both
leaded and unleaded varieties (Greene 1989). These studies find own-price and cross-
price elasticities that exceed 10 in absolute value. Elasticities also tend to be large for
other goods with close substitutes, including breakfast cereals (Nevo 2001), brand-name
and generic pharmaceutical products (Ellison et al. 2006), and individual components
of money supply (Barnett et al. 1992). I improve on this vein of the gasoline demand
literature by formalizing fuel-switching behavior in terms of the distribution of household
preferences for alternative fuels. I use a semi-parametric approach and other methods
to estimate flexible econometric models that allow elasticities to vary with relative fuel
prices.3
In chapter III of this dissertation, my coauthor (James Sallee) and I analyze the market
for “flexible-fuel” vehicles that are able to burn ethanol and gasoline. While interesting in
1Rask (1998) estimates intermediate demand for ethanol as a 10% blending component in gasoline. He does not estimate household
demand. Alves and Bueno (2003) estimate aggregate demand for gasoline in Brazil, which requires 25% ethanol blending in all
gasoline, and where ethanol comprises roughly 40% of the non-diesel fuels market (Perkins and Barros 2006). They do not estimate
price responses for ethanol.
2For recent surveys see Graham and Glaister (2002), Espey (1996, 1998), and Dahl and Sterner (1991). Recent studies indicate that
the price response may have declined even further in recent decades (Hughes et al. 2008; Kilian 2008)
3Hausman and Newey (1995) and Yatchew and No (2001) estimate gasoline demand using a semi-parametric approach and other
flexible methods. They do not model fuel switching.
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its own right, this market also provides a unique opportunity to estimate the cost of tight-
ening fuel-economy standards in the auto industry. An alternative-fuel incentive program
built into federal fuel-economy regulations allows automakers to relax their fuel-economy
constraints by adding flexible-fuel capacity to their vehicles. Because the incremental cost
of adding flexible-fuel capacity is known, automakers that use this incentive program inad-
vertently reveal information about how costly it is for them to improve efficiency. I provide
an overview of the theory, methods, and findings of this analysis in the background section
of chapter III.
CHAPTER II
The Demand for Ethanol as a Gasoline Substitute
The format of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.1 provides background information
on the role of ethanol in the fuels market, ethanol’s environmental effects, and ethanol pro-
duction and distribution. Section 2.2 presents a model of household demand for ethanol as
a gasoline substitute, aggregates households to give an expression of aggregate demand,
and relates the distribution of household preferences for ethanol to aggregate price re-
sponses. Section 2.3 describes the data I use to estimate the model, providing descriptive
statistics that summarize supply and demand behavior. Section 2.4 outlines the economet-
ric model I use to estimate demand, discusses identification, and presents my econometric
results. Section 2.5 uses the distribution of preferences implied by these estimates to sim-
ulate the effects of a national ethanol content standard. Several appendixes follow.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Ethanol’s role in the fuels market
Ethanol is an alcohol fuel that in the United States derives primarily from corn. Gaso-
line blenders mix ethanol with gasoline in ratios of up to 10% to boost oxygen content for
compliance with federal air quality regulations. Oxygen helps the fuel burn more com-
pletely, reducing carbon monoxide emissions in older engines with carburetors. Blenders
also add ethanol to produce mid-grade and premium fuels and to satisfy the federal Re-
6
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newable Fuel Standard and explicit ethanol content requirements in some states. Virtually
all gasoline engines are certified to burn fuel blends that contain 10% ethanol or less.
While gasoline blenders sometimes mix ethanol with gasoline on a discretionary basis
when ethanol prices are low to extend fuel supplies, ethanol’s primary role is as a comple-
ment to gasoline in the production of retail fuels. Total U.S. consumption of ethanol for
gasoline blending was about 5 billion gallons in 2006, or about 3% of gasoline consump-
tion by volume. Ethanol is heavily subsidized, with direct federal and state payments to
ethanol producers, a federal tax subsidy of $0.51 per gallon for blenders that mix ethanol
with gasoline, and a tariff of $0.54 per gallon that applies to all but a nominal quantity of
imports.
The market for ethanol as a direct substitute for gasoline is small but growing rapidly.
Stimulated by rising gasoline prices and supported by federal, state, and local subsidies
for installing alternative fueling infrastructure, the number of fueling stations that offer
E85—an alternative fuel blend of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline—nearly doubled during
2006–2007 to over 1200 stations nationwide.1 On the consumer side of the E85 ethanol
market, the federal Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 created strong incentives un-
der the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards program for carmakers with
binding CAFE constraints—notably the big-three American auto companies—to produce
vehicles capable of burning this fuel blend. Carmakers produced about 5 million of these
so-called flexible-fuel vehicles between 2000 and 2006, and production continues apace.
Most flexible-fuel vehicles are large cars, pickups, and SUVs.
The federal Renewable Fuels Standard, which Congress established in 2005, originally
required that the fuel industry supply a minimum quantity of renewable fuel each year
from 2006–2012. Congress extended and expanded the standard in late 2007. The current
1I often refer to E85 simply as “ethanol” or, when necessary to avoid confusion, as “E85 ethanol” or “retail ethanol.” I distinguish
retail E85 ethanol from “denatured ethanol,” which is blended with gasoline in the production of retail fuels. Denatured ethanol is
nearly pure alcohol but with a small quantity of gasoline or other chemical added, making it unfit for human consumption.
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standard now sets a minimum quantity of renewable fuel each year from 2008–2022, in-
creasing gradually from 9 to 36 billion gallons annually. The quantity standard for 2022
is about 25% of current annual gasoline consumption. The standard is not binding as
of 2007, given other sources of ethanol demand. Once binding, however, the standard is
likely to be met primarily with ethanol. Although the standard mandates a minimum quan-
tity of renewable fuel, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implements the
standard as a percentage of projected fuel consumption. Below I simulate the effects of a
25% ethanol content requirement for gasoline, which corresponds directly to this standard.
Only owners of flexible-fuel vehicles are able to fill their tanks with gasoline blends
that contain more than 10% ethanol without voiding their vehicle warranties. Flexible-
fuel vehicles have specialized fuel lines and gas tanks that are resistant to the corrosive
properties of ethanol. They also contain sensors that can detect the fraction of ethanol
in the fuel and make adjustments to account for ethanol’s higher oxygen content. These
components, which increase vehicle production costs by no more than $100–$200, allow
flexible-fuel vehicles to burn E85 ethanol, regular gasoline, or any combination of the
two. Ethanol has lower energy content than gasoline, implying fewer miles per gallon,
but yields similar power and performance. Published government fuel economy estimates
indicate that the ratio of gasoline to E85 ethanol fuel economy for flexible-fuel vehicles
is about 1.35, or that E85 ethanol delivers about 1−1/1.35 = 25% lower fuel economy.2
Households that only care about minimizing fuel costs will therefore require that ethanol’s
price be discounted at least 25% below gasoline before purchasing ethanol.
2Using Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates for combined city and highway driving, I calculate the ratio of regular
gasoline to E85 ethanol fuel economy for each flexible-fuel vehicle model offered in 2000 through 2006 (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 2006). EPA did not test vehicles using both fuels until 2000, but relatively few flexible-fuel vehicle models were offered prior
to 2000. I calculate the sales-weighted mean ratio using data for nationwide sales of individual flexible-fuel vehicle models from the
U.S. Department of Transportation.
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2.1.2 Ethanol’s environmental and social effects
Replacing one gallon of gasoline with pure corn-based ethanol reduces net petroleum
consumption by 0.95 gallons, after accounting for minor upstream petroleum inputs into
ethanol production and for ethanol’s lower energy content (Farrell et al. 2006). Some pol-
icymakers and industry participants also view ethanol as an increasingly important source
of refined motor fuel, given the significant local opposition to expanding or siting new
petroleum refineries.
Ethanol’s climate benefits are less impressive. Corn collects energy from the sun and
absorbs carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as it grows, but ethanol production from corn
is energy-intensive. The process requires substantial inputs of fertilizer for corn production
and heat for ethanol refining. These inputs derive largely from natural gas given current
production techniques. After taking into account these upstream inputs of fossil energy,
as well as ethanol’s lower fuel economy, replacing gasoline with ethanol only reduces
net carbon dioxide emissions by 15% (Farrell et al. 2006). Ethanol may even increase
emissions after further accounting for direct and indirect land-use changes associated with
growing feedstocks (Searchinger et al. 2008; Fargione et al. 2008).
The local air and water quality benefits of ethanol are mixed. Ethanol is generally per-
ceived to be a cleaner burning fuel than gasoline, leading to improved local air quality,
although modern pollution control equipment largely obviates these advantages. Substi-
tuting ethanol for gasoline reduces tailpipe emissions of benzene, a known human car-
cinogen, but increases emissions of acetaldehyde, which is also a possible carcinogen, as
well as nitrogen oxide, which is a precursor to ozone and smog. Ethanol has the potential
to displace environmentally harmful petroleum refining, but expanding corn production
for ethanol leads to greater use of fertilizers and pesticides on potentially marginal and
environmentally sensitive land.
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Finally, some policymakers worry about the role of ethanol production in driving up
food prices and the impact on poor households.
Household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute vary considerably. Some
households appear to internalize ethanol’s perceived benefits. More than half of drivers
in a recent nationwide poll expressed interest in owning a flexible-fuel vehicle (Harris
Interactive 2006). Of these, nearly 90% were motivated by reducing oil dependence, while
nearly two-thirds wanted to reduce greenhouse emissions. Over 90% of drivers in another
poll said they would prefer a flexible-fuel vehicle. When asked about ethanol’s benefits,
they cited “renewable fuel,” “clean fuel,” “made in America,” and “more economical” with
roughly equal frequency (Phoenix Automotive 2006). In addition to these external factors,
which vary across households, ethanol’s relative mileage varies from vehicle to vehicle and
across driving scenarios, even in highly controlled government tests. On the road, some
households drive primarily in stop-and-go city traffic, while others log a large fraction of
highway miles. These and other differences may affect relative mileage. Households with
particularly strong preferences for ethanol might be induced to purchase the fuel with less
severe distortion of market prices than the average household.
2.1.3 Ethanol production and distribution
As of 2006 there were about 100 ethanol refineries nationwide. Most refineries are
located in the corn belt, although a handful of refineries are located outside the midwest.
Fuel suppliers blend ethanol with gasoline in small ratios to produce fuels with partic-
ular environmental and performance characteristics, and E85 ethanol accounts for a small
fraction of overall ethanol demand. Most blending occurs at fuel blending and distribution
terminals, which are located strategically near population centers throughout the United
States. Terminal operators blend gasoline, ethanol, and other components into finished
fuel products and then distribute the fuels by tanker truck to individual retail fueling sta-
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tions. A relatively small share of ethanol blending occurs at ethanol refineries that have
infrastructure for fuel blending.
Fuel terminals receive most gasoline by pipeline from oil refineries. Existing pipelines
are not suitable for transporting ethanol, however, because ethanol can corrode gasoline
pipelines, and because water can accumulate at low points. Gasoline repels water, but
ethanol does not. Moreover, existing pipelines are configured to move fuel from large
oil refineries to dispersed demand centers, whereas ethanol refineries are considerably
smaller and usually located in rural areas. In the corn belt, tanker trucks deliver ethanol
from ethanol refineries to fuel terminals. Ethanol traveling from the midwest to the coasts
usually goes by rail.
Ethanol is readily available for blending in high ratios wherever large quantities of
ethanol are blended with gasoline. In Minnesota, for instance, ethanol is available at virtu-
ally every fuel terminal any time of year, because Minnesota requires 10% ethanol blend-
ing in gasoline year-round. Terminal operators maintain stocks of gasoline and ethanol
and sometimes lease storage facilities to retail chains who manage their own fuel stocks.
Ethanol is also readily available at a handful of ethanol refineries that have infrastructure
for fuel blending. Ethanol retailers in states like Minnesota have no difficulty resupplying
on short notice, given ethanol’s wide availability for gasoline blending.
2.2 Theoretical model
I develop a model of demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute. The model formalizes
the link between the distribution of household preferences and aggregate prices responses.
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2.2.1 The household’s problem
For the moment I assume that each household owns a single flexible-fuel vehicle. The
household’s utility is quasilinear in transportation services v(·) and other goods:
(2.1) v(e+ rg)+ x,
where v(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, e is consumption of ethanol, g is
consumption of regular gasoline, x is consumption of all other goods, and r is the rate at
which the household converts gallons of regular gasoline into ethanol-equivalent gallons.
Ethanol and gasoline are perfect substitutes. That is, utility is defined over a linear com-
bination of ethanol and gasoline, which I call ethanol-equivalent fuel. When a household
cares only about miles traveled the conversion rate r exactly equals the ratio of the house-
hold’s fuel economy when burning gasoline to its fuel economy when burning ethanol.
This ratio will vary across households due to differences in relative mileage. Addition-
ally, some households will value ethanol for its perceived environmental or social benefits,
while the relative convenience of filling up with ethanol will vary considerably, given its
limited availability. By embodying fuel economy differences and these other factors, r
fully summarizes household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute.
The household’s budget constraint is given by
(2.2) y− pee− pgg− x = 0,
where pe and pg are the prices of ethanol and gasoline, y is income, and I have normalized
the price of the composite good to $1.
Maximization of household utility in (2.1) subject to the budget constraint in (2.2) is
characterized by the following first-order conditions:
(2.3) v′(e+ rg) = pe if e > 0
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and
(2.4) v′(e+ rg) =
pg
r
if g > 0,
where I have implicitly assumed that the household spends some but not all of its income
on the composite good.3 The household equates the marginal utility of ethanol-equivalent
fuel consumption to the ethanol-equivalent price of whichever fuel it chooses.
Suppose the household purchases both ethanol and gasoline so that e > 0 and g > 0.
Then both first-order conditions (2.3) and (2.4) must hold simultaneously, which implies
that pe = pg/r, or equivalently that pg/pe = r. That is, if the household purchases both
ethanol and gasoline, then the ratio of gasoline to ethanol prices must equal the conversion
rate. Otherwise, the household will be at a corner solution and will purchase ethanol exclu-
sively when pe < pg/r and gasoline exclusively when pg/r < pe. That is, the household
will choose the fuel with the lower ethanol-equivalent price. For a household that cares
only about mileage, this amounts to choosing the fuel that is least costly per mile. Because
the conversion rate r equals the relative price where fuel switching occurs, I also refer to
it as the fuel-switching price ratio.
While relative prices determine the type of fuel that a household chooses, quantity de-
manded depends on absolute price levels, with households equating the marginal utility of
ethanol-equivalent fuel consumption to the ethanol-equivalent price of whichever fuel they
choose. For households that choose ethanol, the optimal quantity of ethanol demanded is
given by
(2.5) e∗ = d(pe),
where I have defined ethanol-equivalent fuel demand as d(p) ≡ v′−1(p) given ethanol-
equivalent fuel price p. The quantity of gasoline demanded for households that choose
3Assuming that v′(0) > 1 guarantees that the household always purchases at least some fuel and does not spend all its income on
the composite good. Assuming that y is sufficiently large, so that v′(y/pe) < 1 and v′(ry/pg) < 1, guarantees that the household never
expends its full income on fuel and purchases at least some of the composite good.
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where I divide by r to convert ethanol-equivalent gallons into nominal gallons of gasoline.
I assume that households that do not own a flexible-fuel vehicle have the same utility as
in equation (2.1) but are not able to purchase ethanol. Thus, equation (2.6) is also gasoline
demand for households that do not own a flexible-fuel vehicle.
2.2.2 Aggregate demand
Because ethanol and gasoline are perfect substitutes, households that own flexible-fuel
vehicles sort into ethanol buyers and gasoline buyers according to their fuel-switching
price ratios. While each individual household rests at a corner solution, aggregate demand
will be a smooth function of relative prices when fuel-switching price ratios are distributed
continuously.
To move formally from individual to aggregate demand, I first assume that there are
N households in the market. More precisely, I assume an infinite number of households
of measure N. Each household owns a single vehicle. A fraction ! of households own
flexible-fuel vehicles. I assume that this parameter is set exogenously by policy and that
flexible-fuel vehicles are allocated at random. I discuss the validity of this assumption
below. I next assume that the fuel-switching price ratio r is distributed among households
according to the differentiable cumulative distribution function H(r) defined on [0,").
Recall from above that households will choose ethanol if r < pg/pe, so the fraction of
households with flexible-fuel vehicles that choose ethanol is H(pg/pe). Finally, I assume
that v(·) is identical for all households, which implies that all households that choose
ethanol will consume the same quantity.
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Given these assumptions, aggregate demand for ethanol as a function of fuel prices is










Demand is the total number of households, multiplied by the fraction that own flexible-fuel
vehicles, multiplied by the fraction of these that choose ethanol (which depends on relative
prices), multiplied by the level of ethanol consumption among households that choose
ethanol (which depends on the absolute price of ethanol). Appendix 2.6 provides similar
expressions for aggregate gasoline demand and aggregate welfare, which are important for
the policy simulation below.
The only source of heterogeneity in the model is r, the price ratio at which a house-
hold is indifferent between relying entirely on ethanol or gasoline. I could further allow
for heterogeneity in the propensity to drive, say by multiplying ethanol-equivalent fuel
demand by a scale parameter that varied across households. Assuming that r and this
scale parameter are independent would give the same expression for aggregate demand as
in equation (2.7), multiplied by the expected value of the scale parameter. I address the
potential correlation of fuel-switching price ratios and propensity to drive in section 2.4
below.
Taking logs on both sides yields logged aggregate ethanol demand:






This equation is critical because it relates fuel prices and ethanol quantities to the distribu-
tion of household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute.
Differentiating (2.8) with respect to pg and then multiplying by pg yields the gasoline-
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where h(r) ≡ H ′(r). This cross-price elasticity quantifies the rate at which consumers
switch from regular gasoline to ethanol given a percent increase in the price of gasoline. A
1% increase in gasoline prices leads to a #g% increase in the quantity of ethanol demanded.
Observe that this elasticity is also the elasticity of the share of households that choose
ethanol with respect to the price ratio.






























where I have defined # f ≡ pd′(p)/d(p). The first term in (2.10), which I refer to as the
price elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand, quantifies the rate at which
individual households respond to the price increase by curtailing demand. The second
term in (2.10), which is identical to the gasoline-price elasticity above in (2.9) multiplied
by negative one, quantifies the rate at which households switch from ethanol to gasoline
as the price of ethanol increases. Again, this is the elasticity of the share of households
that choose ethanol with respect to the price ratio, this time multiplied by negative one.
Together these terms imply that a 1% increase in ethanol prices leads to a −#e% decrease
in the quantity of ethanol demanded.













is the hazard rate for exiting the ethanol market as the price ratio decreases. That is,
expression (2.11) gives the instantaneous rate at which households switch to gasoline given
a marginal decrease in the price ratio, conditional on choosing ethanol.
The main benefit of the model is that it formalizes the link between the distribution
of fuel-switching price ratios and aggregate price responses. Given any distribution of
fuel-switching price ratios, equation (2.9) specifies precisely how the cross-price elasticity
of demand varies with relative fuel prices. Equation (2.9) therefore provides a means of
recovering the distribution of fuel-switching price ratios from observed market behavior.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the distribution of fuel-switching price
ratios and the gasoline-price elasticity, as expressed in equation (2.9), for four different
hypothetical density functions. When household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline
substitute are nearly identical, as in figure 2.1(a), fuel-switching behavior is concentrated
around a particular price ratio, which leads to a large and highly variable price response in
that neighborhood. When household preferences are perfectly homogenous, as previous
studies assume, aggregate demand will mirror individual demand: the market will be at a
corner solution, with all households choosing the fuel with the lowest ethanol-equivalent
price. In figure 2.1(a), this would mean a mass point of individuals at the same fuel-
switching price ratio, an infinite price response at that single point, and a zero elasticity
everywhere else. This extreme assumption has important implications for policy analysis.
If ethanol has relatively high costs, so that no ethanol is consumed in the unregulated
equilibrium, large distortions in market prices may be required to induce households to
choose ethanol.
Figures 2.1(b)-2.1(c) show that increasingly diffuse preferences for ethanol lead to
price elasticities that are smaller in magnitude and less variable. Fuel switching extends





































































(d) r ∼ 0.1N(1.0,0.05)+0.9N(1.25,0.05)
Figure 2.1: Hypothetical preferences and elasticity functions
Note: Figure illustrates the relationship between the density function for fuel-switching price ratios and the gasoline-price
elasticity of aggregate ethanol demand, as given by equation (2.9), for four hypothetical density functions.
particular point. Households with particularly strong preferences for ethanol represent
“low-hanging fruit” that can be induced to purchase the fuel with less severe distortion
of market prices. Finally, figure 2.1(d) shows that a distribution with multiple modes can
lead to pronounced peaks in the elasticity function.4 This figure would be consistent with







where I have suppressed dependence on x for convenience. At a “peak” or “trough” in the density function, say x∗, which is also an
inflection point in the distribution function, the slope of the density function is zero: h′(x∗) = H ′′(x∗) = 0. At such a point, the slope of











for x∗ > 0. So the slope of the elasticity function is positive at x∗ if the average value of H(x) on (0,x∗) (i.e., the slope of the line
19
some households valuing ethanol primarily for its fuel economy performance and others
strongly preferring ethanol for environmental and social reasons.
The model also provides a method for disentangling price responses associated with
fuel-switching behavior from price responses associated with overall fuel demand. Adding
equations (2.9) and (2.10) demonstrates that the price elasticity of individual ethanol-
equivalent fuel demand is simply the sum of the two aggregate elasticities:
(2.12) # f = #e +#g.
For a precise quantitative interpretation of this elasticity, consider a simultaneous 1% in-
crease in both fuel prices. No fuel switching occurs, because relative prices do not change,
but households that choose ethanol reduce their demand by # f %. Equation (2.12) therefore
shows how to recover intensive-margin price responses from ethanol demand elasticities,
which primarily reflect fuel-switching behavior.
The shape of the elasticity function has important implications for retail pricing behav-
ior. If the elasticity function is highly variable at the profit-maximizing price ratio, the
relative price charged by a monopolist ethanol retailer will be unresponsive to marginal
costs. This is because variable elasticities coincide with masses of price-sensitive house-
holds. The retailer will be reluctant to raise prices when costs increase, so as to avoid driv-
ing all consumers to gasoline. At the same time, the retailer will have minimal incentive
to reduce prices when costs fall, because lowering prices past the point where households
are indifferent will stimulate little additional demand. If elasticities are roughly constant,
however, retail prices will be highly sensitive to marginal costs. I make these arguments
formally in appendix 2.7 below.
through the origin and H(x∗)) exceeds its slope at x∗. One can determine whether the density function has peaks or troughs from sign
changes in the slope of the elasticity function.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
sales volume (gallons) 3250.36 3930.28 6.90 37770.50
retail ethanol price 1.74 0.35 0.74 3.38
retail gasoline price 1.98 0.43 1.10 3.00
retail gasoline / ethanol price 1.14 0.11 0.68 1.86
wholesale ethanol price 1.27 0.56 0.45 3.03
wholesale gasoline price 1.38 0.45 0.44 2.33
wholesale gasoline / ethanol price 1.17 0.33 0.69 2.45
ethanol pump age (months) 32.72 25.11 1.00 110.00
number flexible-fuel vehicles in county 3497.84 5054.92 0.00 24453.00
number ethanol pumps in county 4.45 3.48 1.00 16.00
number gas stations in county 102.10 113.06 4.00 357.00
Note: Table is based on estimation sample of 5027 monthly reports from 237 fueling stations in Minnesota between
October 1997 and November 2006. Prices are in 2006 dollars.
2.3 Data and summary statistics
I estimate the model of logged aggregate ethanol demand in equation (2.8) above us-
ing monthly data for ethanol prices and sales volumes at a large number of retail fueling
stations, gasoline prices near those stations, and a number of ancillary variables. Table 2.1
presents summary statistics for my estimation sample.
2.3.1 Data sources
These data come from several sources. My data for retail ethanol prices and sales
volumes come from a Minnesota Department of Commerce (MNDOC) and American
Lung Association of Minnesota (ALAMN) monthly survey of retail ethanol stations in
Minnesota. Stations that received funding to help defray ethanol infrastructure costs are
required to respond, while other stations may participate on a voluntary basis. This re-
quirement is not strongly enforced, however, and stations that are required to report do not
always do so. The earliest stations began reporting in October 1997, and the data include
records through November 2006. Stations report volume-weighted prices derived from

































































































Oct97 Oct98 Oct99 Oct00 Oct01 Oct02 Oct03 Oct04 Oct05 Oct06
Month
Ratio of retail gasoline to ethanol price
Ethanol sales volume
Figure 2.2: Relative retail prices and ethanol sales
Note: Ethanol sales volume is the monthly average volume of ethanol sales among reporting
ethanol stations in Minnesota. The ratio of gasoline to ethanol prices is the volume-weighted
sample mean price of gasoline divided by the volume-weighted sample mean price of ethanol.
taxes. State and federal fuel taxes did not change during my sample period. The data also
record open and close dates for all retail ethanol pumps in Minnesota. I use this informa-
tion to calculate the total number of stations operating retail ethanol pumps in each county
in each month and the length of time that each pump has been operating. While the data do
not reveal precise station locations or other identifying information, they do indicate the
counties where pumps are located. I match these retail ethanol data to county average retail
prices for regular gasoline from Oil Price Information Service (OPIS). I convert all prices
to real 2006 prices using the monthly consumer price index from the U.S. Department of
Labor.
Figure 2.2 plots relative retail prices from October 1997 through November 2006. Rel-
ative prices vary considerably over the sample period, with the relative price of gasoline
trending upward. Average ethanol sales also increase steadily over time. The relationship
is not necessarily causal, however, as the increase in sales volume is also consistent with a
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growing stock of flexible-fuel vehicles. I am careful in my estimation to control explicitly
for flexible-fuel vehicles and secular trends in fuel demand. Short-run increases in the rel-
ative price of gasoline correlate with contemporaneous increases in ethanol sales volumes,
which is perhaps more suggestive of a price response. OLS estimates of this relationship
are potentially biased, however, if unmodeled shifts in demand cause fuel prices to change.
I discuss identification of demand parameters in greater detail below.
As a measure of underlying fuel costs, I obtain wholesale ethanol price data from a
trade publication called Ethanol and Biodiesel News (previously known as Renewable
Fuels News and Oxy-Fuel News before that). These data measure weekly spot prices at
fuel terminals for denatured ethanol in Minneapolis and Fargo. I assign wholesale prices
to stations based on proximity to these cities. About four-fifths of stations are located in
counties nearest to Minneapolis. I calculate the monthly average of these weekly prices
and then subtract the federal ethanol blending subsidy, which fell from $0.54 per gallon
to $0.51 per gallon during my study period. I obtain wholesale gasoline price data come
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). These data measure the volume-
weighted monthly average spot price in Minnesota. Although wholesale spot price data are
available for additional Minnesota cities at a substantial cost from proprietary sources, in
practice these prices track each other very closely (Minnesota Department of Agriculture
2003). I use these wholesale price variables to interpret retail pricing behavior.
In addition to these price variables, I obtain data on flexible-fuel vehicle registrations
from the Minnesota Department of Public Safety Division of Driver and Vehicle Services.
These data record vehicle identification numbers (VINs), original sales dates, and owner
zip codes for all vehicles registered in Minnesota as of the summer of 2007. I iden-
tify 154,000 flexible-fuel vehicles in the database by cross-referencing VINs with lists of















































































Figure 2.3: Flexible-fuel vehicles and retail ethanol stations
Note: Figure shows growth in number of retail ethanol stations and stock of flexible-fuel vehi-
cles in Minnesota.
tion and from a private firm that collects data on the auto industry. These vehicles represent
about 3.3% of the 4.6 million light-duty vehicles registered in Minnesota in 2007. I then
use original sales dates to reconstruct a monthly time series for the stock of flexible-fuel
vehicles in each county.5
Figure 2.3 charts the growth in retail ethanol stations and Minnesota’s stock of flexible-
fuel vehicles during the study period. The flexible-fuel vehicle stock grows at a roughly
constant rate during the sample period, which is consistent with CAFE standards that gen-
erated strong incentives for some manufacturers to produce a limited number of flexible-
fuel vehicles each year. Growth in the number of retail ethanol stations accelerated in
2000, when ALAMN negotiated an agreement with a particular retail chain to subsidize
ethanol pumps at a large number of its stations. Growth accelerated again in 2004-2005.
5I am unable to determine whether some vehicles are flexible-fuel vehicles due to missing or invalid VINs, and a relatively small
number of flexible-fuel vehicles are excluded due to missing sales dates or zip codes outside Minnesota. I also unable to account for
vehicle attrition or historical movements of vehicles in and out of Minnesota and across county lines prior to 2007. Owner addresses
also might differ from counties where flexible-fuel vehicles are actually driven. For these various reasons I measure flexible-fuel vehicle
stocks with some error.
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Figure 2.4: Minnesota’s retail ethanol stations
Note: Figure shows locations of Minnesota’s 264 retail ethanol fueling stations as of August 2006. Min-
nesota measures 400 miles from north to south and about 250 miles along its southern border. The shaded
region is the seven-county metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul, which measures 65 miles north to
south and 60 miles east to west.
High gasoline prices and low wholesale ethanol costs may have contributed to this accel-
erated growth.
As I note above, I calculate the total number of retail ethanol stations in each county
in each month in order to quantify variation in competition. Figure 2.4 maps the locations
of all 264 retail ethanol stations in Minnesota as of August 2006 based on a separate list
of station addresses from MNDOC. For comparison, I also calculate the total number
of retail gasoline stations operating in each Minnesota county in 2006 based on station
address information from the Minnesota Department of Commerce Weights and Measures
Division. Table 2.1, which assumes the same number of gas stations operating in each
county for 1997-2006, shows that there are more than 20 gasoline stations for every ethanol
station on average in my sample.6 While competition in fuel markets is fierce, most ethanol
retailers operate as local monopolists in the narrower retail ethanol market.
My analysis covers the time period from October 1997 through November 2006. Dur-
6The actual ratio is probably even higher. Although most of the nearly 2900 individual stations operating in 2006 were also operating
during 1997-2005 (Buccelli 2007), the total number of retail stations statewide declined about 7% from 1997–2006 (National Petroleum
News 2006).
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ing this time the number of retail ethanol stations in Minnesota grew from less than 10
to nearly 300. Based on reported open and close dates, there were a total of nearly 9000
potential monthly observations at these stations. Approximately 56% of these potential
observations are covered by the MNDOC/ALAMN survey. The remaining 44% are miss-
ing, reflecting both stations that never participate in the survey, as well as stations that fail
to report in some months. This results in an estimation sample of 5027 observations at 237
stations, implying an average panel size of about 21 months. Some stations operate nearly
the entire study period, while others operate for just a few months, as is clear from figure
2.3.
My retail ethanol survey data are subject to several potential layers of sample selection.
First, not all stations participate in the survey, and not all participating stations report every
month. Most stations do participate, however, and the probability that participating sta-
tions report is not correlated with fuel prices. Second, fueling station owners might locate
ethanol pumps in areas where preferences for ethanol are strongest. Stations are spread
throughout Minnesota, however, covering every major region of the state except the north-
east, which is sparsely populated. Finally, sales data reflect the behavior of households
that self-selected to own flexible-fuel vehicles and participate in the nascent ethanol mar-
ket. Selection on price is not problematic, as my analysis will control explicitly for fuel
prices. Selection on familiarity with ethanol is also not cause for concern, at least in recent
years. Most drivers know whether they own a flexible-fuel vehicle, and most flexible-fuel
drivers are well-informed about ethanol and its availability in their area (Phoenix Automo-
tive 2006).
Potentially more problematic is the possibility that flexible-fuel drivers have system-
atically different preferences than other drivers. Flexible-fuel vehicle owners tend to buy
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of retail price discount
Note: Figure shows the distribution of ethanol’s nominal retail price discount relative to gaso-
line in the estimation sample.
sider minivans and pickups for their next vehicle purchase, while other drivers are more
likely to consider smaller cars (Phoenix Automotive 2006). Furthermore, most flexible-
fuel vehicles have identical gasoline-only counterparts, which could lead to sorting directly
on flexible-fuel capability. On the other hand, production of flexible-fuel vehicles derives
almost entirely from federal fuel-economy regulations. Carmakers sell flexible-fuel vehi-
cles all over the country, even in areas without ethanol, and anecdotally offer flexible-fuel
vehicles for the same prices as their gasoline-only counterparts. So sorting on flexible-fuel
capability is not necessarily a major problem.
2.3.2 Retail pricing behavior
I spoke with industry representatives and inspected retail pricing behavior closely to
identify price variation that is arguably exogenous to demand.7
7I spoke with representatives from the largest chains in Minnesota that offer retail ethanol, as well as several independently owned
and operated stations, representatives from two ethanol refiners that directly supply about one-third of retail ethanol stations in Min-
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Ratio of wholesale gasoline to ethanol price
Ratio of retail gasoline to ethanol price
Figure 2.6: Relative wholesale prices and relative retail fuel prices
Note: The ratios of gasoline to ethanol prices are the volume-weighted sample mean prices of
gasoline divided by the volume-weighted sample mean prices of ethanol.
Retailers generally price ethanol at a discount to regular gasoline in nominal increments
of $0.10 per gallon. This behavior is manifest in figure 2.5, which plots the distribution
of nominal price discounts in my sample, and is consistent with how retailers tell me they
determine prices. Clustering near salient discounts would be even more pronounced if I
had station-level gasoline prices. The discounts in the figure are based on county average
gasoline prices.
The sizes of these discounts are governed by broad market conditions. Average dis-
counts generally increase when wholesale ethanol prices fall relative to gasoline, and dis-
counts decrease when ethanol prices rise, as is evident in figure 2.6.
While average discounts appear to respond immediately to changes in underlying costs,
industry representatives I spoke with indicated that discounts at individual stations often
persist at the same level for months or years at a time. Retailers update discounts in-
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Figure 2.7: Example of one station’s nominal price discount
Note: Figure shows ethanol’s nominal price discount relative to gasoline for a particular ethanol
retailer over time.
adjusted on a daily basis, nor are they adjusted in response to shifts in ethanol-specific
demand. This behavior is evident in figure 2.7, which plots the nominal price discount
over time for one particular station in the sample. This station has been operating longer
than most but its behavior is not atypical. This pricing behavior facilitates identification of
demand parameters. Because retailers maintain the same discounts for extended periods of
time, unmodeled shifts in ethanol demand will tend not to translate to changes in relative
fuel prices.
Changes in market spot prices affect retailers differently, depending on the relationships
they have with suppliers. First, some retailers buy ethanol directly from ethanol refineries,
while others purchase ethanol at fuel terminals. Second, some retailers purchase ethanol
on the spot market and bear the full brunt of variation in spot prices, but many retailers
have long-term contracts for wholesale ethanol. Contract prices are less variable than ob-
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Ratio of wholesale gasoline to ethanol price
Dispersion of retail price ratio
Figure 2.8: Dispersion of relative retail prices
Note: Dispersion of retail price ratio is the monthly standard deviation of the OLS residuals
from the retail price ratio regressed on a vector of month dummies and station fixed effects.
This variable quantifies differential changes in relative prices across stations.
correlate with comparatively small changes in retail prices. See appendix 2.8 for more
detail on this issue and an extended discussion about determinants of wholesale prices.
Finally, contracts employ different pricing formulae. Some contracts peg ethanol costs
directly to the spot price of gasoline, while others tie costs to some average of gasoline
and ethanol. These formulae vary across stations and over time. This variation in supply
relationships and contracts leads to cross-sectional variation in retail pricing behavior. Re-
tailers also may face varying degrees of competition, leading to differential pass through
of wholesale ethanol costs. See appendix 2.9 for further details.
Variation in pricing behavior is important because it allows me to control for month ef-
fects that are common to all stations and still identify demand parameters off of differential
changes in fuel prices across stations. To quantify this variation, I regressed relative retail
prices on a vector of month dummy variables and station fixed effects. I then computed
the standard deviation of the residuals from this regression within each month. I refer to
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this standard deviation as the dispersion of relative prices. Figure 2.8 shows that price
dispersion increases when gasoline spot prices are high relative to ethanol. This behavior
is consistent with the different supply relationships that I document. Some stations have
ethanol contracts that tie wholesale ethanol costs to gasoline, while other stations purchase
ethanol on the spot market. Variation in costs therefore increases whenever spot prices di-
verge. This behavior is also consistent with differences in competition. When ethanol
costs are low relative to gasoline, competitive retailers are forced to reduce prices, while
less competitive retailers are able to price closer to gasoline. Price dispersion decreases
when the gap between ethanol costs and gasoline prices narrows.
2.4 Econometric estimation and results
2.4.1 Econometric model
I estimate logged aggregate ethanol demand of the following form:






+&′Xit + 't +(i +)i(t)+ *it ,
where: Eit is the volume of ethanol sales at fueling station i in month t; peit is the retail
price of ethanol and pgit is the retail price of regular gasoline; Xit is a vector of time-
varying county and station characteristics; 't is a month effect that is constant across all
fueling stations; (i is a fueling station effect that is constant across all time periods; )i(t)
is a station-specific quadratic time trend; *it is an error term; and the remaining elements
are coefficients, vectors of coefficients, and functions to be estimated. Note that equation
(2.13) is the empirical analog of logged aggregate demand in theoretical equation (2.8)
above.
My theoretical model implies that elasticities may vary dramatically with relative prices.
I allow for variable elasticities using several approaches. My main estimates use a flexible
polynomial approximation for F(·). I also estimate the model using a cubic spline and
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semi-parametric approximation of F(·).
The own-price elasticity of ethanol demand is simply %−F ′(ln pg/pe). The gasoline
price elasticity is F ′(ln pg/pe), which is equivalent to the elasticity of the share of house-
holds that choose ethanol with respect to relative prices. Following equation (2.12), the
price elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand is the sum of the gasoline-
price and own-price elasticities, which simplifies here to %. The functional form in (2.13)
therefore generates constant-elasticity estimates for the response of overall fuel demand to
changes in fuel price levels.
The fueling station effect (i controls for persistent differences in fueling station charac-
teristics, such as brand name, location, and amenities. The station effect also controls for
persistent determinants of local fuel demand, including household income and other de-
mographics, driving habits, and fuel economy performance. The month dummy variables
given by 't control for secular trends in demand due to growing awareness of flexible-
fuel vehicle capabilities or rising state income levels. The station-specific quadratic time
trends )i(t) control for similar factors that evolve at different rates locally. Finally, the
month dummies control for potential seasonality in demand, including the well-known
surge in driving that occurs each summer.8
The vector of time-varying station characteristics Xit includes the log of the county’s
flexible-fuel vehicle stock. The vector also includes the log of the total number of stations
that offer retail ethanol in the same county. While a negative coefficient would imply that
new stations draw customers away from existing stations, a zero coefficient might only
suggest that new stations locate where competition is weak. This measure of competi-
tion reflects retailer choices about when and where to install ethanol pumps, and these
8The minimum denatured ethanol content of retail ethanol in Minnesota varies seasonally due to cold weather starting issues,
ranging from 70% in the winter to 79% in the summer (U.S. Department of Energy 2006). Although the month dummies control
for seasonality in the level of demand, they do not control for potential seasonality in the price elasticity of demand due to variation
in denatured ethanol content. Variation in ethanol content is relatively minor, however, and unlikely to be transparent to consumers,
making it neither problematic nor useful for identification.
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decisions presumably depend critically on the locations of existing pumps. Table 2.1 in-
dicates that there are less than 5 retail ethanol stations per county, while there are more
than twenty times as many gasoline stations. A finding of significant competition in retail
ethanol markets would therefore be surprising. Finally, the vector of time-varying station
characteristics includes dummy variables that indicate the length of time that a station has
been offering ethanol. These dummy variables differ from the month dummy variables
because start dates vary from station to station. Sales will likely be low after a station first
opens before customers are fully aware of the new opportunity to purchase ethanol.
2.4.2 Identification
I estimate equation (2.13) using OLS. OLS estimates are potentially biased if unmod-
eled shifts in ethanol demand correlate with fuel prices. This is a standard endogeneity
problem in estimating demand functions. Shifts in ethanol-specific demand would tend to
bias estimates of the own-price elasticity toward zero, if such shifts led to higher ethanol
prices. In contrast, shifts in overall fuel demand would increase prices for all fuels, in
which case relative fuel prices might arguably be exogenous. This would facilitate iden-
tification because I am primarily interested in fuel-switching behavior, which depends on
relative prices. Endogeneous fuel price levels would nevertheless bias the OLS estimate
for the price elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand.
I argue that the price variation I quantify in figure 2.8 is largely orthogonal to the er-
ror term in equation (2.13). The station owners I spoke with indicated that they do not
update retail ethanol prices in response to local short-term demand shifts. Rather, station
owners price ethanol at nominal discounts to regular gasoline in increments of $0.10 per
gallon, often maintain these same discounts for extended periods of time, and only ad-
just discounts in response to changes in underlying fuel costs. This behavior largely rules
out ethanol-specific demand shifts at individual stations being correlated with station-level
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price changes and biasing OLS estimates.9
Changes in underlying fuel costs could still be endogeneous to local demand shifts,
however, if such shifts were correlated across many stations (Kennan 1989). A classic
example is the surge in summer travel demand that drives up fuel prices. I control for
these and other correlated demand shifts using month dummy variables. While these con-
trols throw away potentially useful time-series variation in retail fuel prices, I am able
to document a variety of relationships between retail ethanol stations and their wholesale
suppliers, which lead to cross-sectional variation in pricing behavior. Figure 2.8 demon-
strates that there is substantial variation in relative fuel prices, even after controlling for
month and station effects.
Finally, I control for localized demand shifts using station-specific quadratic trends. In
using this approach I implicitly assume that local demand shifts evolve slowly relative to
shifts in supply. This assumption appears to have rigorous empirical justification, at least
in the case of the world oil market (see Kilian (2007)).
2.4.3 Estimation results
Polynomial results
Table 2.2 presents my OLS estimation results based on polynomial approximations for
fuel-switching behavior. I control for station effects using fixed-effects and first-difference
estimators, which may have different efficiency properties. All logged price variables have
been normalized to equal zero at sample mean prices. This allows me to interpret each
coefficient estimate in the second row directly as the gasoline-price elasticity of ethanol
demand evaluated at sample mean prices.10
9There may be theoretical justification for retailers being unresponsive to local demand shifts when setting relative prices. For
a monopolist ethanol retailer, relative retail prices will be invariant to demand shifts that enter multiplicatively by scaling aggregate
demand. This is because multiplicative demand shifts do not alter the shape of the own-price elasticity function, leaving the monopolist’s
first-order pricing condition unchanged. See appendix 2.7 below for benchmark models of retail pricing behavior.
10All price variables have been normalized according to:
p∗ = p/ p̄,
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Table 2.2: Main estimation results
Fixed effects First differences
Variable linear quadratic cubic linear quadratic cubic
ln(price ethanol) 0.48 0.41 0.35 0.77 0.66 0.64
(0.64) (0.66) (0.64) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)1 2.60 2.63 3.04 2.41 2.45 2.58
(0.64) (0.65) (0.67) (0.56) (0.53) (0.55)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)2 -2.58 -2.63 -3.19 -3.22
(1.06) (0.86) (0.91) (0.86)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)3 -6.38 -1.97
(3.73) (3.65)
ln(number flex-fuel vehicles) 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(number ethanol stations) -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
month 1 of operation -1.20 -1.18 -1.18 -0.99 -0.95 -0.95
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
month 2 of operation -0.28 -0.28 -0.27 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
month 3 of operation -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
month 4 of operation -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
number observations 5027 5027 5027 4332 4332 4332
number of stations 237 237 237 201 201 201
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.34 0.36 0.36
mean gasoline-price elasticity 2.60 2.65 2.88 2.41 2.48 2.55
of ethanol demand (0.64) (0.65) (0.64) (0.56) (0.53) (0.53)
1st-order correlation of residuals 0.39 0.40 0.39 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Note: Dependent variable is logged monthly ethanol sales volume in gallons. Logged price variables have been normalized to equal
zero at sample mean prices. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by station. Fixed-effects regressions use deviations from
within-station means to control for station effects. First-difference regressions do not include a constant term, as this term is removed
by first differencing. All regressions include month dummy variables and station-specific quadratic time trends. Mean gasoline-price
elasticity is the sample mean predicted elasticity. First-order correlation of residuals is the coefficient from the least-squares regression
of residuals on their lagged values. See text for details.
Ethanol demand is sensitive to price changes. The coefficient on logged relative prices
for fixed-effects estimation of the linear model implies that the gasoline-price elasticity of
aggregate ethanol demand is 2.60. This elasticity is equivalent to the elasticity of the share
of households that choose ethanol with respect to relative prices. The same coefficient
is 2.63 for fixed-effects estimation of the quadratic model and 3.04 for the cubic model.
These are gasoline-price elasticities evaluated at mean prices. Sample mean elasticities
near the bottom of table 2.2 confirm that average price responses are somewhat smaller in
where p∗ is the normalized price variable I use for estimation, p is the price variable prior to normalization, and p̄ is the sample
mean of p. The normalized prices equal unity at mean prices, while their logged values equal zero. Coefficients on the quadratic and
higher-order terms therefore drop out of the elasticity calculations at sample mean prices.
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the linear model, which imposes constant elasticities. These results suggest that it may be
important to allow elasticities to vary with relative prices.
Mean elasticity estimates are 0.2-0.3 smaller when using first-difference estimation to
control for station effects. There are at least two plausible explanations. First, if demand
does not respond fully to changes in relative fuel prices within the first month, the esti-
mators may give different results. First-difference estimates exploit differential variation
in relative fuel prices in adjacent time periods only, while fixed-effects estimates relate
average sales volumes to relative fuel prices in all periods. For this reason fixed-effects
estimates may be more robust to delayed responses. I return to this issue below. Second, I
calculate relative fuel prices based on county average gasoline prices. While it is unclear
that a different level of aggregation is more appropriate, measurement error in relative
prices will tend to bias elasticity estimates toward zero. This bias is usually more severe
in first-difference estimates (Griliches and Hausman 1986).
Standard errors in table 2.2 are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. While
the first-difference estimates for the price responses have narrower confidence intervals
than the fixed-effects estimates, neither estimator is fully efficient. First-order serial cor-
relation in the fixed-effects residuals is 0.39–0.40 and statistically different from zero.
First-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals is −0.27. This coefficient is
statistically different from zero, which indicates that the first-difference estimates are not
efficient. This coefficient is also statistically different from −0.5, which confirms the in-
ference based on the fixed-effects residuals that the model’s errors are serially correlated
(Wooldridge 2002). That −0.27 ≈ −(1− 0.39)/2 is consistent with the model’s errors
following an AR(1) process (Solon 1984).
The coefficients on the logged price of ethanol in the first row give an estimate of the
constant price elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand. The fixed-effects
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estimates imply that this elasticity is 0.35–0.48. These estimates have the incorrect sign
but are statistically indistinguishable from the range of estimates in the literature. The first-
difference estimates imply an ethanol-equivalent elasticity of 0.64–0.77, again with the
incorrect sign. I am still unable to rule out equivalence with previous estimates, however,
even with narrower confidence intervals.
There are several plausible explanations for why these point estimates have the incor-
rect signs. First, my theoretical model implicitly assumes that fuel-switching price ratios
and the propensity to consume fuel are uncorrelated. In fact, households that require a
larger discount before purchasing ethanol might also drive smaller cars or log fewer miles.
This negative correlation between fuel-switching price ratios and fuel demand could gen-
erate a positive coefficient on the logged price of ethanol. When the price of ethanol in-
creases, conserving households that dislike ethanol would be the first to switch to gasoline,
leaving only fuel-guzzling households in the ethanol market.
Second, the positive coefficient on the logged price of ethanol indicates that a propor-
tional increase in all fuel prices generates additional ethanol demand. Higher overall fuel
prices might provide an additional boost for ethanol, if households are frustrated with large
oil companies, feel a greater sense of social responsibility to reduce oil consumption, or
devote more time to learning about alternative fueling opportunities.
Third, some consumers may respond to linear differences in fuel prices as opposed to
differences in relative prices. When the price of gasoline exceeds the price of ethanol,
a proportional increase in fuel prices leaves relative prices unchanged, but the absolute
increase in gasoline prices is larger. I investigated this issue by adding a variable mea-
suring the linear difference between retail gasoline and ethanol prices to regressions that
also included logged relative prices. The coefficient estimates had the incorrect signs and
were highly insignificant for both fixed-effects and first-difference estimation, however,
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suggesting that the model is correctly specified in relative fuel prices (see column 8 of
tables 2.5 and 2.6 in appendix 2.12 below).
Fourth, fuel-switching behavior in the short term may be more sensitive to gasoline
prices than ethanol prices. Gasoline pumps and price postings are ubiquitous, while
ethanol is limited to several hundred stations statewide or less. I tested for delayed price
effects by adding one-period, two-period, and three-period lagged price variables to the
linear polynomial regressions (see table 2.7 in appendix 2.12 below). The cumulative
elasticity of ethanol-equivalent fuel demand continued to have the incorrect sign, but it
was smaller in magnitude in the one-period and two-period distributed lag models. The
cumulative response to relative prices exceeded the initial response, but not dramatically
so. The difference in magnitude between the initial and cumulative response was also
larger for the first-difference estimates, which is consistent with the intuition above that
the fixed-effects estimates are more robust to delayed responses. None of the cumulative
responses was close to being statistically different from the corresponding initial response.
Finally, the incorrect signs may be related to measurement error and bias in the fuel-
switching price responses, as I discuss above.
Interpreting the quadratic and cubic terms in table 2.2 is less straightforward. The
coefficient on the quadratic term is negative in both the quadratic and cubic regressions,
implying that the gasoline-price elasticity function is downward sloping at mean prices.
The coefficient on the cubic term for fixed-effects estimation of the cubic model is nega-
tive, implying that the gasoline-price elasticity function is convex in logged relative prices.
Equivalently, the own-price elasticity is concave. Elasticities appear to be linear functions
of logged relative prices based on the first-difference estimates, where the cubic term is
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.






















































































































































Figure 2.9: Estimated gasoline-price elasticities
Note: Figure shows gasoline-price elasticity of aggregate ethanol demand based on fixed-effects polynomial, first-
differences polynomial, cubic spline, and semi-parametric estimation. Pilot bandwidth is 0.03 for semi-parametric es-
timates. Solid gray lines are 95% confidence intervals for estimates based on ninth-order polynomials, cubic spline with
knots every 0.10, and semi-parametric estimates with pilot bandwidth 0.03. Confidence intervals for semi-parametric esti-
mates are based on standard errors from local polynomial regressions. Semi-parametric estimates using the two narrowest
bandwidths are hidden in the extremes of the data, as these estimates were fluctuating wildly outside the range of the
figure. See text for details.
the coefficient estimates in table 2.2 to calculate the gasoline-price elasticity of aggregate
ethanol demand as a function of relative prices. Figures 2.9(a)–(b) plot this elasticity
function for the fixed-effects and first-difference estimates. Elasticity functions based on
the cubic model decline slightly in magnitude as the ratio of gasoline to ethanol prices
increases.
The cubic model would have difficulty revealing sharp peaks in the elasticity function,
so I also estimated the model using more flexible polynomial approximations. Figures
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2.9(a)–(b) plot estimates of the elasticity function based on a ninth-order polynomial, as
well as a fifteenth-order polynomial, which minimized the Bayesian Information Crite-
rion (BIC) for fixed-effects estimation. A quadratic model minimized the BIC for first-
difference estimation. Elasticities based on the higher-order polynomial approximations
reveal additional non-linearities but are not statistically different from the more restric-
tive cubic estimates. Sample mean elasticities for the more flexible fixed-effects estimates
increase moderately to about 3.0. Mean elasticities for the more flexible first-difference
estimates remain at about 2.5.
Coefficient estimates for price effects were robust to replacing station-specific quadratic
time trends with county-specific trends, excluding time trends altogether, and dropping an-
cillary station and county control variables. Excluding month dummy variables increased
the ethanol-equivalent price elasticity in the wrong direction, however, and led to a large
increase in the fuel-switching price response (see tables 2.5 and 2.6 in appendix 2.12 be-
low). The month dummies are important.
Returning to the estimates in table 2.2, the coefficients on flexible-fuel vehicle stocks
indicate that doubling the number of vehicles leads to a 7%-8% increase in ethanol sales
volumes. I had expected to find a coefficient estimate closer to 1, indicating that ethanol
sales increase proportionally with the density of potential buyers. I suspect that this esti-
mate is biased toward zero as a result of measurement error, which is exacerbated in panel
data models (Hausman 2001). Using my monthly panel of flexible-fuel vehicle stocks,
I regressed the logged number of flexible-fuel vehicles on a vector of county and month
dummy variables. These controls explained over 99% of the variation in flexible-fuel vehi-
cle stocks. Any residual variation that remains is likely dominated by measurement error,
given that I construct my panel using a snapshot of vehicles on the road in 2007.
The next row of coefficients indicate that doubling the number of pumps per county
40
leads to a 12%-14% reduction in sales volumes at individual stations. Because this mea-
sure of competition reflects choices about when and where to install new ethanol pumps,
the coefficients do not quantify the effect on sales volumes of new pumps located at ran-
dom, nor do they quantify the effect of new pumps locating in direct proximity to existing
stations. Interpreted properly, the coefficient estimates suggest that new pumps locate in
areas where competition is weak, drawing only a small number of customers away from
existing stations. This result is not surprising, given the small number of ethanol pumps
statewide.
Finally, the last set of coefficients indicate that ethanol sales volumes are particularly
low in the first months after a pump first begins operating. Sales volumes are close to zero
in the first month but quickly increase to normal levels by about the third or fourth month.
This rapid increase in sales volume indicates that market participants are well-informed
about ethanol’s availability.
Coefficients on variables measuring the impact of flexible-fuel vehicle stocks, compe-
tition, and the length of time that pumps have been operating were virtually unchanged
in models that added higher-order polynomial terms. Coefficients measuring the price
elasticity of ethanol-equivalent fuel demand were also unchanged.
Cubic spline and semi-parametric results
Polynomial approximations in general are sensitive to the number of terms, to outliers,
and to the local fit of the approximation. To test the performance of the polynomials, I also
estimated equation (2.13) using a cubic spline approximation with knots at relative price
intervals of 0.05, 0.10, and 0.20 prior to taking logarithms.11 Cubic spline approximations
are more flexible and less sensitive to outliers than polynomials, but are sensitive to the
number and placement of knots. Finally, I estimated the model semi-parametrically using






























Figure 2.10: Elasticity based on semi-parametric estimates
Note: Figure shows gasoline-price elasticity of aggregate ethanol demand based on semi-
parametric estimation using Yatchew’s (1997) estimator and local polynomial estimation of
non-parametric component. Figure shows estimates using bandwidths of approximately 0.015,
0.03, and 0.06. Solid gray lines are 95% confidence intervals are for estimates that use a band-
width of 0.03 and are based on standard errors from local polynomial regressions. See text for
details.
Yatchew’s (1997) estimator for the partial linear model with a bandwidth of 0.03 and
bandwidths half and twice as large.12 Semi-parametric estimators give more detailed local
approximations, but estimates are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth. See Hausman and
Newey (1995) for a discussion of these tradeoffs in an application on gasoline demand.
Figures 2.9(c)–(d) plot the elasticity estimates from the cubic spline and semi-parametric
approaches. For neither the cubic spline nor semi-parametric approaches am I able to re-
ject the least flexible of the functional forms, although the more flexible semi-parametric
12For a general partial-linear model given by:
yt = f (xt)+Zt &+ *t ,
Yatchew’s procedure entails: (1) sorting the data by xt , (2) differencing the data to remove the non-linear component f (xt) under the
assumption that f (xt) ≈ f (xs) for xt ≈ xs, (3) estimating & parametrically on the differenced data, (4) subtracting the predicted value
from this parametric regression from the original dependent variable to yield yt −Z′t &̂, and finally (5) regressing yt −Z′t &̂ on xt non-
parametically using any number of non-parametric regression techniques. I employ tenth-order differencing using Yatchew’s (1998)
optimal differencing weights, which improves efficiency to within 5% of Robinson’s (1988) fully efficient procedure. I control for
station effects using station dummy variables. I estimate the non-parametric portion of the model using local polynomial regression,
which has attractive properties in the extremes of the data. Polynomials also yield intuitive and convenient estimates for first derivatives.
I use a quadratic local polynomial, which is appropriate for estimating first derivatives (Fan and Gijbels 1996), and an Epanechnikov
kernel weighting function. I calculate the optimal “pilot” bandwidth using a rule-of-thumb approximation (Fan and Gijbels 1996,
p.111).
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ln(number flex-fuel vehicles) 0.02
(0.01)
ln(number ethanol stations) -0.10
(0.04)
month 1 of operation -0.98
(0.05)
month 2 of operation -0.23
(0.05)
month 3 of operation -0.12
(0.04)




Note: Table is based on first-stage regression from Yatchew’s (1997) semi-
parametric estimator using tenth-order differencing to remove the nonparamet-
ric component. Dependent variable is logged monthly ethanol sales volume in
gallons. Standard errors do not adjust for heteroskedasticity or serial correla-
tion; robust standard errors require undoing the effects of differencing in the first
stage. Regression includes station dummy variables, month dummy variables,
and station-specific quadratic time trends. R-squared reflects all of these control
variables. See text for details.
approach reveals additional nonlinearities that the polynomial and cubic spline approaches
obscure. Figure 2.10 based on the semi-parametric estimates shows moderately sized
peaks in the elasticity function where ethanol is discounted 5%, 10%, and 15% relative
to gasoline. These peaks may reflect clustering of fuel-switching behavior around salient
switch points. Sample mean elasticities based on the cubic spline and semi-parametric
estimates are about 3.0 after excluding roughly 100 outliers in the extremes of the data.
For cubic spline approximation, coefficients measuring the impact of flexible-fuel ve-
hicle stocks, competition, and the length of time that pumps have been operating were
virtually identical to the fixed-effects polynomial coefficients, as was the elasticity of
ethanol-equivalent fuel demand. The semi-parametric approach also yielded broadly sim-
ilar coefficient estimates, as table 2.3 shows, although the impact of flexible-fuel vehicle
stocks fell nearly to zero. The elasticity of ethanol-equivalent fuel demand still had the
incorrect sign, but the coefficient fell by half.
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Preference heterogeneity
Figure 2.9 demonstrates that the polynomial, cubic spline, and semi-parametric ap-
proaches all yield broadly similar elasticity functions, except in the extremes of the data
where I have few observations. For each approach I am unable to reject estimates based
on the least flexible model, be it the cubic polynomial, spline with the fewest knots, or
semi-parametric approximation with the widest bandwidth. Elasticities are large and vari-
able, though not nearly as large and variable as they would be if household preferences
for ethanol were more homogeneous, as in figure 2.1(a). At a minimum, fuel-switching
behavior extends over a wide range of relative prices where ethanol is discounted 0%-25%
below gasoline. This suggests that preferences for ethanol are diffuse.
Unfortunately, I am not able to reveal the full distribution of preferences for ethanol as
a gasoline substitute. This would clearly require an estimate of the elasticity function over
all possible fuel-switching price ratios. This information is not available, given the limited
range of prices that have been observed historically and the high variance of my estimates
in the extremes of the data. That is, for example, I do not observe ethanol discounted 50%
below gasoline, so I am unable to estimate the elasticity function or say anything about
preferences in that neighborhood. I make this argument formally in appendix 2.10 below.
If I assume that fuel-switching price ratios are distributed normally, however, with a
mean of 1.35, which is consistent with relative fuel economy in government tests, then I
can calibrate the standard deviation to match what I estimate econometrically. Choosing a
standard deviation of 0.43 yields an elasticity function whose sample mean is 3.0, which
is consistent with my estimates. The resulting elasticity function is close to linear and has
roughly the same overall height and slope as the polynomial and cubic spline estimates in
figure 2.9.





































Figure 2.11: Elasticity function over time
Note: Figure shows the gasoline-price elasticity of aggregate ethanol demand estimated sep-
arately for 1997–2003 and 2004–2006. Estimates are based on cubic spline approximations
with knots every 0.10. Solid gray lines are 95% confidence intervals for estimates using data
from 2004-2006. See text for details.
preferences for ethanol have shifted over time by splitting my sample in half and estimat-
ing the model separately on data for 1997–2003 and 2004–2006. Preferences may have
shifted as the stock of flexible-fuel vehicles has increased or as information about ethanol
has improved. Similarly, the distribution may have narrowed as the number of stations has
grown and heterogeneity associated with distance has diminished. Figure 2.11 presents
elasticity estimates from these time periods based on a cubic spline approximation. Ignor-
ing the extremes of the data where I have few observations, the elasticity function appears
to have flattened and declined in magnitude. This is consistent with heterogeneity increas-
ing over time, although the differences are not statistically significant. Estimates based
on a polynomial approximation tell a similar story. I did not estimate the semi-parametric
model separately for the two time periods, given the small sample sizes.
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2.5 Policy simulation
I use my model and estimates to simulate the effects of an ethanol content standard,
which mandates that denatured ethanol comprise a minimum fraction of the overall fuel
supply. I simulate 10% and 25% standards. The 25% standard is consistent with the federal
Renewable Fuel Standard of 36 billion gallons annually for 2022, which represents 25%
of current gasoline consumption.13 I assume in my simulations that the standard is met
entirely through increasing the market share of E85 ethanol, although blending denatured
ethanol with regular gasoline in other ratios would also be a potential compliance strategy.
My model and estimates also could be used to evaluate other government policies that
promote retail ethanol.
I simulate these standards assuming that fuel-switching price ratios are normally dis-
tributed with mean 1.35 and standard deviation 0.43. This results in a gasoline-price elas-
ticity function with a similar shape as what I estimate econometrically. For comparison to
previous analyses that assume identical preferences, I simulate the same standards assum-
ing that fuel-switching price ratios are nearly identical with mean 1.35. I close the model
by adding a supply side, drawing on previous work by Holland et al. (2007). I numerically
search for retail fuel prices and a shadow value on the ethanol content constraint such that
households maximize utility, suppliers maximize profits, the ethanol content standard is
met, and markets clear. See the bottom of table 2.4 and appendix 2.11 for further details
on the simulation.
Table 2.4 presents the simulation results. Consider first the results for scenario 2, which
assumes that households have nearly identical preferences based on ethanol’s fuel econ-
omy performance relative to gasoline. This constrains the equilibrium price ratio under
13Recall that while this standard mandates a minimum quantity of renewable fuel, the EPA rulemaking that implements the standard
sets a minimum percentage of renewable fuel in each compliance period. EPA chooses the standard in advance of each compliance
period based on projected fuel demand in an attempt to achieve the quantity specified by legislation. Implementation of the policy is
therefore identical to a minimum market share requirement.
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Table 2.4: Simulation results
Scenario 1: heterogeneous households Ethanol standard0% 10% 25%
equilibrium ethanol price ($/gallon) 3.52 3.49 2.88
equilibrium gasoline price ($/gallon) 2.47 2.47 2.90
equilibrium gasoline / ethanol price 0.70 0.71 1.00
quantity denatured ethanol (billion gallons) 12.62 12.92 30.49
quantity pure gasoline (billion gallons) 115.74 115.36 91.23
emissions (million mtCO2) 1081.41 1079.58 954.90
change consumer surplus (billion $) 0 0.1 -33.34
change producer surplus (billion $) 0 -0.11 -0.43
change tax revenue (billion $) 0 -0.21 -12.41
total cost (billion $) 0 0.22 46.18
cost per gasoline saved ($/gallon) 0 0.59 1.88
cost per emissions reduced ($/mtCO2) 0 121.34 365.04
Scenario 2: homogeneous households Ethanol standard0% 10% 25%
equilibrium ethanol price ($/gallon) 2.67 2.04 2.45
equilibrium gasoline price ($/gallon) 2.62 2.72 3.31
equilibrium gasoline / ethanol price 0.98 1.33 1.35
quantity denatured ethanol (billion gallons) 5.37 13.80 34.88
quantity pure gasoline (billion gallons) 132.12 125.11 104.44
emissions (million mtCO2) 1189.40 1169.78 1093.05
change consumer surplus (billion $) 0 -13.01 -90.94
change producer surplus (billion $) 0 0.13 9.56
change tax revenue (billion $) 0 -3.64 -9.38
total cost (billion $) 0 16.51 90.76
cost per gasoline saved ($/gallon) 0 2.36 3.28
cost per emissions reduced ($/mtCO2) 0 841.43 941.93
Note: Table shows simulation results for 10% and 25% ethanol content standards. Scenario 1 assumes fuel-switching
price ratios distributed normally with mean 1.35 and standard deviation 0.43, while scenario 2 assumes mean 1.35 and
standard deviation 0.01. All simulations assume: that every household owns a flexible-fuel vehicle, or equivalently, that
flexible-fuel conversions are costless; a constant price elasticity for individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand of -0.25;
a competitive fuel supply industry producing retail ethanol and retail gasoline to maximize profits subject to the ethanol
content standard; constant price elasticities of 1.25 and 2.5 for pure gasoline and denatured ethanol supply; 8.8 kilograms
of CO2 emissions per gallon of gasoline; and that replacing gasoline with ethanol reduces CO2 emissions by 15% on an
energy-adjusted basis. I calibrate the aggregate ethanol-equivalent fuel demand function to 2006 gasoline quantities and
retail prices. I calibrate supply functions to 2006 denatured ethanol and gasoline quantities and national average wholesale
spot prices net of the ethanol blending subsidy. I add a constant marginal cost for fuel distribution, marketing, taxes, and
subsidies, which I calculate as the mean difference between retail and wholesale fuel prices. See appendix 2.11 for further
details.
47
the standard to be near the fuel economy ratio of 1.35. A 25% ethanol content standard re-
duces gasoline consumption by about 22% and reduces carbon dioxide emissions by about
8%. The policy is costly, however, at $90 billion annually. I calculate total costs based on
changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tax revenue net of the federal ethanol
subsidy.
Now consider the simulation results for scenario 1, where I have calibrated the standard
deviation of preferences to match my econometric estimates. After calibrating the model
to my econometric estimates, the surplus cost of a 25% ethanol content standard falls by
half. Costs are lower in scenario 1 because households with particularly strong preferences
for ethanol represent “low-hanging fruit” that are induced to purchase ethanol with less
severe distortion of market prices.14 About three-quarters of the $46 billion cost falls on
consumers, while the rest falls on taxpayers. The fuel supply industry neither benefits
nor suffers under the policy, although producer surplus in the table does not distinguish
between ethanol and gasoline producers. The ethanol content standard reduces gasoline
consumption by about 21% and carbon dioxide emissions by 12%.
The ethanol content standard remains a costly policy, however, even after accounting
for household heterogeneity. Surplus costs for the 25% standard average about $1.90 per
gallon of gasoline saved. For comparison, a recent study by Harrington et al. (2007) as-
sumes $0.12 per gallon for the external costs of petroleum dependence, though the studies
they review estimate a range of $0.08–$0.50 per gallon.15 Surplus costs average about
$370 per ton of carbon dioxide emissions avoided. Again, these costs far outweigh cli-
mate damages. A recent meta-analysis suggests that marginal damages are unlikely to
14In fact, baseline ethanol consumption is actually higher in scenario 1, and the 10% standard is just barely binding. The expansion
of baseline ethanol consumption above current levels occurs because I assume for the simulation that all households own flexible-
fuel vehicles, whereas in reality this fraction is quite small. The cost of flexible-fuel vehicle conversions is low but not zero, and so
production of these vehicles derives primarily from CAFE incentives. Endogenizing flexible-fuel conversions by adding conversion
costs to the analysis would reduce the impact of heterogeneity and increase the cost of complying with an ethanol content standard.
15They include petroleum dependence costs in a comprehensive measure of gasoline-related externalities, which they estimate at
$2.20 per gallon. The majority of these costs depend on miles driven, however, and therefore hit ethanol even more strongly due to its
poor mileage relative to gasoline.
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exceed $15 per ton of carbon dioxide emissions (Tol 2005), while even pessimistic recent
estimates put marginal damages at only $85 per ton (Stern 2006). These estimates are
sensitive to assumptions about ethanol’s life-cycle emissions. If land-use changes negate
ethanol’s moderate climate benefits, as recent studies suggest is likely, the ethanol content
standard will actually increase greenhouse emissions.
There are several limitations to these results. First, my estimates reflect preferences
of households that have self-selected to own flexible-fuel vehicles and participate in the
nascent ethanol market. These households likely have the strongest preferences for ethanol
and may have a different propensity to drive. Second, I assume that flexible-fuel conver-
sions are costless. Third, much of the observed variation in household preferences for
ethanol likely derives from differences in ethanol’s convenience. Although I was not able
to detect any significant changes between 1997-2003 and 2004-2006, this source of het-
erogeneity will likely diminish as the ethanol market further expands and ethanol becomes
available in more locations. Addressing the first two issues would tend to increase the
estimated cost of the standard, while addressing the third would reduce the impact of het-
erogeneity.
On the supply side, previous research does not estimate ethanol and gasoline supply
elasticities particularly convincingly. Second, I do not consider the interaction of the
ethanol content standard with preexisting distortions, such as agricultural price supports,
nor do I consider other general equilibrium effects. Commodity prices are currently high,
however, and price floors are not binding. Finally, I do not consider the potential for a
breakthrough technology that facilitates cheap ethanol production from agricultural waste
or other feedstocks, which may improve ethanol’s cost-effectiveness in mitigating carbon
dioxide emissions. While the Renewable Fuel Standard actually mandates that a substan-
tial fraction of the standard be met with such fuels, forcing these technologies prematurely
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could increase the cost of the standard. Addressing these issues would have an ambiguous
effect on the estimated cost of the standard.
2.6 Appendix: Aggregate demand and household welfare
I show above that the aggregate ethanol demand is






Aggregate demand for gasoline reflects households that own flexible-fuel vehicles but
choose gasoline, as well as households that do not own flexible-fuel vehicles. Gasoline















which is just the total number of households that do not own flexible-fuel vehicles multi-
plied by their average gasoline consumption. Here I rely on the assumption that flexible-
fuel vehicles are allocated at random, which implies that fuel-switching price ratios are dis-
tributed identically for households that do and do not own flexible-fuel vehicles. Adding
these two expressions gives aggregate gasoline demand:











Maximized utility for an individual household that chooses ethanol is
(2.18) v(d(pe))+ y− ped(pe),
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which holds whenever r≤ pg/pe, while a household that chooses gasoline has utility given
by




which holds whenever r > pg/pe. Because I assume that household utility is linearly
separable in the composite good, and because I assume an interior solution with respect to
consumption of this good, each household’s utility function has dollar units. This allows























where the top term is average welfare for households that own flexible-fuel vehicles weighted
by the fraction of these households, and the bottom term is average welfare for households
that do not own flexible-fuel vehicles weighted by the fraction of such households. Av-
erage welfare for households that own flexible-fuel vehicles reflects both households that
choose ethanol as well as households that choose gasoline. Multiplying by the total num-
ber of households N gives aggregate welfare.
2.7 Appendix: Retail supply behavior
How will a retailer facing the demand functions developed above respond to shifting
costs? For an ethanol retailer located close to other retailers, competition will drive the
retail price of ethanol down to marginal costs:
(2.21) pe = ce,
51
where ce is the marginal cost of ethanol. The equilibrium ratio of retail gasoline to ethanol





where + = pg/pe is the price ratio the retailer chooses, and where I assume for simplicity
that the retail price of gasoline pg is fixed exogenously by conditions in the retail gaso-






When ethanol’s cost relative to the price of gasoline increases, relative retail prices increase
accordingly.
Marginal-cost pricing is not a particularly good model for understanding retail ethanol
pricing behavior. Current retail ethanol markets reflect a peculiar mix of monopoly power
and competition. Because relatively few stations offer retail ethanol, customer bases over-
lap only marginally, if at all, allowing ethanol retailers to operate largely as local monopo-
lists. At the same time, these retailers compete directly with nearby gasoline stations in the
broader fuels market, because flexible-fuel vehicle owners are able to switch seamlessly
between ethanol and gasoline. The monopolist ethanol retailer that only offers ethanol
chooses the price of ethanol to maximize profits:
(2.24) ,(pe; pg) = E(pe; pg)pe− ceE(pe; pg),
where , is retailer profit, which is a function of the retail prices of ethanol pe and regular
gasoline pg, E is the quantity of ethanol demanded as a function of retail prices, and ce is
16This assumption is consistent with the current fuel market, where relatively few stations offer ethanol and ethanol sales volumes
are low relative to gasoline. This assumption would not be valid for a significantly expanded retail ethanol market.
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the constant marginal cost of offering ethanol. I assume for simplicity that the retail price
of gasoline pg is fixed exogenously by conditions in the retail gasoline market.
The first-order condition of this maximization problem is given by:
(2.25) E +E ′pe− ceE ′ ≡ 0,
where all derivatives are with respect to the retail price of ethanol and I have suppressed
the arguments of functions for clarity. Collecting terms that contain E ′, moving E to the














where µe ≡ (pe− ce)/pe is the percent retail markup of ethanol and #e is the own-price
elasticity of aggregate ethanol demand. This is the standard monopoly result where the
retailer equates the percent retail markup to the negative reciprocal of the price elasticity
of demand.17
Restating the first-order condition in terms of the price ratio + by making the substitu-
tions pe = pg/+ and #e =−#g +# f yields:
(2.28) 1− +
pg/ce
≡− 1−#g +# f
,
17Pricing behavior is more complicated when the ethanol retailer also offers gasoline. Adding profits from gasoline sales to the













where G′ is the change in gasoline sales volume given a marginal increase in the price of ethanol, µg ≡ (pg − cg)/pg is the percent
retail markup of gasoline, and all other terms are as above. I again assume that retail gasoline prices are fixed by market competition.
When a station’s ethanol price has no effect on its gasoline sales, so that G′ = 0, the first-order condition reduces to the simple case
above. When G′ > 0, however, the optimal price of ethanol is higher, because increasing the price of ethanol drives some consumers to
gasoline at the same station. This incentive increases with G′. The incentive to increase ethanol prices and drive consumers to gasoline
also increases with gasoline markups µg. In practice, retailers are unlikely to retain many customers that switch to gasoline when the
price of ethanol increases, given the large number of competing stations that also offer gasoline. So G′ will likely be quite small in the
current market, and pricing behavior will tend toward the simple case above.
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where + is the price ratio the retailer chooses. Assuming that the price elasticity of indi-
vidual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand # f is constant, the implicit function theorem gives















where +∗ is the profit-maximizing price ratio and the inequality assumes that #′g < 0 at
the optimum. Recall that # f is constant by assumption and that #g and #′g only depend on
relative prices.
Expression (2.29) implies that changes in relative costs will have their largest impact
on relative retail prices when the gasoline-price elasticity is roughly constant near the op-
timum, so that #′g is close to zero. In contrast, when the elasticity is highly variable near
the optimum, which indicates a large concentration of households near that same fuel-
switching price ratio, #′g will be large in magnitude and relative prices will be less respon-
sive to changes in ethanol’s costs. In the extreme case where households have identical
preferences for ethanol, #′g will be infinitely large in magnitude and relative prices will be
invariant to underlying costs. Retailers will be reluctant to raise ethanol prices when costs
increase, lest they drive all consumers to gasoline. At the same time, retailers will have no
incentive to reduce prices when costs fall, because lowering prices will not stimulate any
additional demand.
Figure 2.12 illustrates this first-order condition and comparative static for two hypo-
thetical gasoline-price elasticity functions, where I have set the elasticity of individual
ethanol-equivalent fuel demand to a constant -0.25. The figures illustrate that when house-
hold preferences are nearly homogeneous, so that price elasticities are highly variable,

























(b) r ∼ N(1.25,0.30)
Figure 2.12: Profit-maximizing retail price ratio
Note: Figure illustrates profit-maximizing price ratios for a monopolist ethanol retailer. Profit-maximizing price ratios
are given by interesection of markups and the negative reciprocal of the own-price elasticity, as in equation (2.27). More
profitable and less profitable cases assume that marginal ethanol costs are 60% and 80% the retail price of gasoline.
Elasticity functions assume a constant ethanol-equivalent fuel price elasticity of -0.25.
costs. When household preferences are more diffuse, however, so that price elasticities
are less variable, as in figure 2.12(b), shifts in relative costs lead to large changes in the
profit-maximizing price ratio.
2.8 Appendix: Aggregate price trends
Figure 2.13 plots average retail ethanol and regular gasoline prices from October 1997
through November 2006. Average ethanol prices track regular gasoline prices closely,
albeit at a noticeable discount for most of the period.
Figure 2.14 plots average wholesale prices for the same time period. Wholesale spot
prices for denatured ethanol do not always track wholesale gasoline prices closely. This
is perhaps not surprising, given that demand for denatured ethanol derives largely from its
role as a complement to gasoline production and less from its role as a gasoline substitute.
Opportunities for direct substitution do exist, however, and large price differences can cre-
ate strong incentives for substitution, which is one reason that wholesale ethanol prices





































Figure 2.13: Retail fuel prices
Note: Retail ethanol price is the monthly volume-weighted average retail price of ethanol at
reporting stations in Minnesota. Retail gasoline price is the monthly county average retail price





































Figure 2.14: Wholesale fuel prices
Note: Wholesale ethanol price is a weighted average of the spot price for denatured ethanol in
Minneapolis and Fargo, less the federal ethanol blending tax credit. Wholesale gasoline price
is the Minnesota volume-weighted average rack price. Prices are in 2006 dollars.
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of 2005, when ethanol helped ease gasoline shortfalls after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
knocked out Gulf Coast petroleum refineries and distribution pipelines. Ethanol prices
were low relative to gasoline in the first half of 2005 due to a glut of ethanol. Ethanol
prices then spiked to equal gasoline prices as ethanol substituted for gasoline after the hur-
ricanes. Ethanol’s margin relative to gasoline eventually returned to pre-hurricane levels
as refineries and pipelines came back on line and as imports of refined gasoline arrived
from abroad.
A second reason that wholesale prices track broadly is that ethanol and a petroleum-
based chemical fuel additive called methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) are close sub-
stitutes in many U.S. regions during much of this time period, creating an avenue for
petroleum prices to correlate indirectly with ethanol prices. The importance of this substi-
tution is most evident in the first half of 2006, when fuel suppliers quit using MTBE due
to concerns about potential groundwater contamination. Prices surged as ethanol filled the
gap left by this key substitute. Ethanol prices fell in the summer months as ethanol refiners
scaled up production and as fuel distributors resolved logistical difficulties in transporting
ethanol from refineries in the midwest, where ethanol is produced, to markets on the coasts,
where MTBE had previously held a large market share.
Figure 2.6 above demonstrates that large fluctuations in relative wholesale prices corre-
late with comparatively small changes in retail prices. Note that the scale for the wholesale
price ratio in figure 2.6 above is five times as large as the scale for the retail price ratio.
What explains this behavior? The natural assumption is that ethanol retailers are pricing
ethanol based primarily on what flexible-fuel vehicle owners are willing to pay, relative to
gasoline, as opposed to what the fuel costs. As I show above in appendix 2.7, when the
elasticity is highly variable and retailers are monopolists, the relative price of ethanol will
be insensitive to changes in ethanol’s costs relative to gasoline. The pricing behavior in
57
figure 2.6 is therefore consistent with a highly variable elasticity function.
There are alternative explanations. First, denatured ethanol costs may differ substan-
tially from publicly reported spot prices. The industry representatives I spoke with indi-
cated that most retailers purchase ethanol in long-term contracts ranging from six months
to one year. Contracts often tie costs directly to the price of gasoline, which is consistent
with the long-term relationship between ethanol and gasoline prices. Few retailers buy
denatured ethanol on the spot market, because spot prices are typically higher than long-
term contract prices. Although retailers sometimes purchase ethanol on the spot market to
cover minor shortfalls, the quantities involved are generally small. In short, publicly re-
ported spot prices overstate the variability of wholesale ethanol costs relative to gasoline.
Second, retailers may have an incentive to absorb temporary fluctuations in relative
costs. Given the relatively small number of ethanol stations, ethanol consumers may
drive longer distances or coordinate their daily and weekly activities around refueling with
ethanol. If the relative price of ethanol is highly variable, so that households are unsure
whether ethanol’s discount will be sufficiently generous, they may be less willing to incur
these search costs. Station owners therefore have an incentive to allay this uncertainty by
maintaining retail ethanol prices that are more consistent with the long-run relationship
between gasoline prices and ethanol costs. Short-term profits may suffer, but this strategy
helps maintain a consistent customer base. Indeed, several industry representatives I spoke
with indicated that some retailers were actually pricing ethanol below costs in late 2005
and early 2006. Ethanol costs were high relative to gasoline, due to the discontinuation
of MTBE, but some retailers were willing to incur temporary losses to maintain favorable
relationships with their customers. I am also told that the earliest retailers had particularly
low sales volumes until they learned to price ethanol at a consistent discount to gasoline.



















































































(b) Twin Cities vs. rural
Figure 2.15: Relative wholesale prices and relative retail fuel prices
Note: Top figure shows relative retail prices for stations in counties within 50 miles of Benson and for other rural counties.
Bottom figure shows relative retail prices for stations in Twin Cities counties and for stations in rural counties.
2.9 Appendix: Evidence of cross-sectional variation in pricing behavior
About one-third of ethanol retailers in Minnesota purchase ethanol directly from an
ethanol refinery in Benson, which is located in the southwestern part of the state. Through-
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out the entire sample period, this refinery supplied retail ethanol at a fixed nominal dis-
count to the spot price of regular gasoline. The ethanol retailers, in turn, agreed to price
retail ethanol at the same discount below regular gasoline at their stations.18 When retail
ethanol prices are tied directly to the price of gasoline, relative prices will be less respon-
sive to changes in ethanol’s relative cost. This is apparent in figure 2.15(a), which plots
relative retail prices for stations located in counties within 50 miles of the Benson refinery,
which are most likely to have contracts with this refinery, and for stations located in other
counties outside the Twin Cities. In 2000-2001, when wholesale ethanol costs were high
relative to gasoline, stations near Benson priced ethanol at a larger percent discount. This
happened again in late 2003-2004 and at times in late 2005-2006.
Figure 2.15(b) plots relative retail prices for stations located inside and outside the Twin
Cities, where the density of retail ethanol stations is higher. Stations in the Twin Cities
appear to be more sensitive to changes in relative costs. When wholesale ethanol costs
are low relative to gasoline, stations in the Twin Cities discount ethanol more heavily than
in rural areas. When wholesale ethanol costs are high relative to gasoline, retailers in the
Twin Cities do not discount ethanol as generously. This pricing behavior is consistent with
retailers in the Twin Cities facing greater competition and therefore being more sensitive
to changes in relative costs.
2.10 Appendix: Using elasticity estimates to reveal preferences
It is possible in theory to retrieve the distribution of household preferences from aggre-
gate price repsonses. Recall that equation (2.9) above links the distribution of household
18The discount was fixed at $0.20 per gallon for several years, then increased to $0.40 per gallon for several years, and finally
fluctuated between $0.35 and $0.70 per gallon for the last several years. This unique pricing agreement ended in the fall of 2007. The
ethanol refinery now supplies retail ethanol at market prices, and retailers are free to price ethanol at whatever price the market will
bear. I am not aware of any similar agreements between ethanol retailers and their suppliers.
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Assume that fuel-switching price ratios are known to range from rL to rH . Then integrating




















= exp(C) · H(r).
Given C and an econometric estimate of #g(x) over the interval [rL,r], equation (2.33)
yields an estimate of the distribution of household preferences.
A boundary condition is required to solve for C. The lower boundary will not work.
This is clear from equation (2.32), where the right side is undefined at the lower bound
where r = rL because H(rL) = 0. The lower boundary condition does not work because
the elasticity function in equation (2.9) is undefined at rL. The upper boundary will work,
however, provided that an estimate for the gasoline-price elasticity function covering the
entire interval [rL,rH ] is available. At the upper boundary H(rH) = 1 so C is simply the
area under the function #g(x)/x on the interval [rL,rH ]. Any other pair of r∗ ∈ (rL,rH) and
H(r∗) will also work as a boundary condition if H(r∗) is somehow known.
Unfortunately, I am not able to reveal the full distribution of household preferences for
ethanol based on my estimates, because I do not have an estimate of the elasticity function
over the entire range of possible fuel-switching price ratios.
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2.11 Appendix: Simulation details
2.11.1 Minimum ethanol content standard
An ethanol content standard mandates that denatured ethanol comprise a minimum





where E and G are the aggregate retail quantities of ethanol and gasoline, -e is the percent
denatured ethanol content of retail ethanol, -g is the percent denatured ethanol content of
retail gasoline, and . is the minimum fraction of denatured ethanol in the fuel supply as
mandated by the ethanol content standard. I assume that -e ≥ .≥ -g, where the leftmost
inequality guarantees that the ethanol content standard is technically achievable, and the
rightmost inequality implies that the standard is not met trivially for any combination of
fuels. Rearranging the inequality demonstrates that the standard is equivalent to a mini-







An ethanol content standard is therefore identical to any fuel performance standard
that implicitly mandates a minimum market share requirement for ethanol, including a
low-carbon fuel standard met through increased ethanol production.
2.11.2 Model of the fuels market
Following Holland et al. (2007) I assume that a competitive fuel supply industry maxi-
mizes profits given by:
(2.36) peE + pgG−C(E,G)+/[-eE +-gG−.(E +G)],
where pe and pg are the retail prices of ethanol and regular gasoline, E and G are the ag-
gregate retail quantities of ethanol and regular gasoline, C(·, ·) is the fuel industry’s cost
62
function, which is increasing in both arguments and convex, / is the shadow value of the
ethanol content constraint, and -e and -g are as above. Note that the total quantity of
denatured ethanol required to produce the given retail quantities is -eE + -gG, while the
total quantity of pure gasoline is (1−-e)E +(1−-g)G. The cost function reflects dena-
tured ethanol and gasoline refining and distribution costs, as well as the costs of blending,
distribution, and retail marketing. The cost function also reflects retail fuel taxes, as well
as subsidies for denatured ethanol blending.
The first-order conditions from the fuel supplier profit maximization problem and the










(2.39) /[-eE +-gG−.(E +G)] = 0,
where / ≥ 0. The first condition holds for all consumers with r ≤ pg/pe who choose
ethanol and the second condition holds for all consumers with r > pg/pe who choose
gasoline. These equilibrium conditions state that each household’s marginal willingness
to pay for fuel equals the fuel supply industry’s marginal cost. The third condition is that
either the ethanol content constraint is binding or that the shadow value of the constraint
is zero.
The ethanol content standard gives an implicit subsidy of /[-e−.] for the production of
retail ethanol, because the denatured ethanol content of retail ethanol exceeds the standard.
Conversely, the standard imposes an implicit tax of /[.−-g] on the production of retail
gasoline, because the denatured ethanol content of gasoline is less than the standard. The
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ultimate effect of the standard on equilibrium fuel quantities depends on the stringency
of the standard, the fuel industry’s cost function, the household’s ethanol-equivalent fuel
demand function, and the distribution of fuel-switching price ratios.
Holland et al. (2007) use a similar model to evaluate a low-carbon fuel standard met
through increased ethanol production. They show that such a standard can never deliver
efficient reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, because the standard implicitly subsi-
dizes ethanol while taxing gasoline. Any first-best policy must tax all fuels that contain
carbon, including ethanol, based on marginal external damages. They also show that a
low-carbon fuel standard might actually increase energy consumption and carbon dioxide
emissions, because the fuel supply industry could meet the standard simply by increasing
ethanol production. This is similar to the well-known result that a pollution performance
standard may create incentives to expand output if the rate of pollution increases less than
proportionally with production. These results apply equally to my analysis of an ethanol
content standard.
2.11.3 Demand calibration
I assume that the fuel consumption component of individual utility is of the form:





so that the first-order conditions in (2.3) and (2.4) above yield the following expression for
individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand:
(2.41) d(p) = kp−*,
where k is a constant, p is the ethanol-equivalent price, and −* is the constant price elas-
ticity of ethanol-equivalent fuel demand. The assumption that individual demand has a
constant price elasticity is consistent with my econometric model, which also generates
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a constant price elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand. Maximized indi-





From here, it is straightforward to calculate aggregate quantities of retail ethanol and gaso-
line demand, as well as aggregate household welfare, based on the general expressions
available in appendix 2.6. Given the functional form assumption above, these expressions
depend on the price elasticity of individual ethanol-equivalent fuel demand −*, the scale
of fuel demand Nk, the fraction of households that own flexible-fuel vehicles !, and the
distribution of fuel-switching price ratios H(r).
I calibrate −* = −0.25 based previous estimates of this parameter in the literature. I
then calibrate Nk based on aggregate gasoline demand and average retail gasoline prices
in 2006 under the assumption that ! = 0. This is consistent with current market conditions
where few households own flexible-fuel vehicles. I then reset ! = 1 for the simulations.
Simulations therefore reflect market conditions in a hypothetical world where the scale of
ethanol-equivalent fuel demand is equivalent to current levels but where all households
own flexible-fuel vehicles. Finally, I calibrate H(r) by assuming that fuel-switching price
ratios are normally distributed with mean 1.35 and standard deviation 0.43, which results
in a gasoline-price elasticity function that has roughly the same shape as what I estimate
econometrically.
2.11.4 Supply calibration










= -gKeBe0e +(1−-g)KgBg0g +1g + 2g−-g3,
where: -e and -g are the denatured ethanol content ratios of retail ethanol and gaso-
line; Be ≡ -eE + -gG and Bg ≡ (1−-e)E +(1−-g)G are the quantities of pure ethanol
and gasoline required to produce the retail quantities E and G; the functions KeBe0e and
KgBg0g are marginal costs of denatured ethanol and gasoline production, reflecting all
costs through delivery to fuel terminals, with 0e, 0g, Ke, and Kg parameters to be cali-
brated; 1e and 1g are the constant marginal costs of distributing fuels to retail outlets and
retail marketing, to be calibrated; 2e and 2g are retail fuel taxes remitted by fuel retailers to
state and federal governments; and 3 is the federal blending subsidy for denatured ethanol.
I assume that -e = 0.85, because E85 ethanol contains 85% denatured ethanol, and
calibrate -g = 0.04, which was the fraction of denatured ethanol in gasoline in 2006. I
assume 8.8 kilograms of CO2 emissions per gallon of gasoline and that replacing gasoline
with ethanol reduces CO2 emissions by 15% on an energy-adjusted basis. I assume that
the constant price elasticity of denatured ethanol supply is 1/0e = 2.5 and that the price
elasticity of gasoline supply is 1/0g = 1.25, which are the midpoints of the ranges con-
sidered by Holland et al. (2007) based on their reading of the previous literature. I then
calibrate Ke and Kg based on 2006 production quantities and wholesale spot prices for de-
natured ethanol and gasoline. I calibrate distribution and marketing costs 1e = 1g = $0.16
as the current differential between average wholesale prices for retail gasoline and average
pre-tax retail prices. I calibrate 2e = 2g = $0.50 as the average differential between pre-tax
and tax-inclusive retail prices. Finally, I calibrate 3 = $0.51, which is the current federal
subsidy for denatured ethanol blending.
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2.11.5 Numerical solution algorithm
The numerical solution algorithm is as follows:
(1) Choose an initial fuel price vector p0 = [p0e , p0g].
(2) Set initial shadow value of ethanol content constraint to zero: / = 0.
(3) Compute quantities supplied based on initial price vector and first-order conditions
from industry profit maximization problem. If fuel supply industry is not in compli-
ance, increase /, return to step (2), and iterate until industry is exactly in compliance
with the ethanol content standard, yielding retail quantities supplied S0 = [S0e ,S0g]
(4) Compute retail quantities demanded based on initial price vector and first-order con-
ditions from household maximization problem, yielding retail quantities demanded
D0 = [D0e ,D0g].
(5) If the markets clear, that is if
D0−S0 = [D0e ,D0g]− [S0e ,S0g] = [0,0],
then stop. Otherwise, update the price vector according to p1 = p0 + 4[D0− S0],
where 4 is a positive constant. This moves the price vector in a direction that reduces
excess demand. In practice I decrease 4 as the number of iterations increases in order
to hone in on the market-clearing price vector. Return to step (1), and iterate.
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2.12 Appendix: Additional estimation results
Table 2.5: Estimation results—robustness of fixed-effects estimator
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(price ethanol) 0.48 0.15 0.01 1.33 2.22 0.39 0.35 0.53
(0.64) (0.65) (0.80) (0.11) (0.15) (0.64) (0.64) (0.68)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)1 2.60 2.52 2.69 3.84 5.63 2.55 3.04 3.16
(0.64) (0.67) (0.85) (0.34) (0.40) (0.66) (0.67) (1.44)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)2 -2.63
(0.86)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)3 -6.38
(3.73)
gas price minus ethanol price) -0.31
(0.78)
ln(number flex-fuel vehicles) 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.18 0.08 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(number ethanol stations) -0.14 -0.35 -0.14 -0.06 0.12 -0.13 -0.14
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
month 1 of operation -1.20 -1.06 -0.92 -1.14 -1.11 -1.18 -1.20
(0.19) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.20) (0.19)
month 2 of operation -0.28 -0.26 -0.18 -0.32 -0.44 -0.27 -0.28
(0.15) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15)
month 3 of operation -0.14 -0.16 -0.10 -0.16 -0.32 -0.13 -0.13
(0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
month 4 of operation -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07 -0.26 -0.04 -0.04
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
station-specific quadratic trend x x x x x
county-specific quadratic trend x
month dummies x x x x x x
number observations 5027 5027 5027 5027 5027 5027 5027 5027
number stations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
R-squared 0.84 0.76 0.68 0.80 0.57 na 0.84 0.84
first-order correlation of residuals 0.39 0.54 0.62 0.44 0.66 0.38 0.39 0.39
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Note: Dependent variable is logged monthly ethanol sales volume in gallons. Logged price variables have been normalized to equal
zero at sample mean prices. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by station. All regressions except (6) use deviations from
within-station means to control for station effects. Regression (1) is identical to the linear fixed-effects regression above in table 2.2
and is included for comparison. Regression (2) replaces the station-specific quadratic trend with a county-specific quadratic trend.
Regression (3) drops all quadratic trends. Regression (4) drops month dummy variables. Regression (5) drops all time controls.
Regression (6) drops station and county characteristics. I estimated this regression using dummy variables to control for station effects
as the within-station estimator had numerical difficulties; I therefore omit the within R-squared for this regression. Regression (7) is
identical to the cubic fixed-effects regression above in table 2.2. Regression (8) adds the retail gasoline minus ethanol price. First-order
correlation of residuals is the coefficient from the least-squares regression of residuals on their lagged values. See text for details.
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Table 2.6: Estimation results—robustness of first-difference estimator
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(price ethanol) 0.77 0.77 0.67 1.06 1.08 0.63 0.64 0.86
(0.48) (0.46) (0.45) (0.11) (0.09) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)1 2.41 2.42 2.32 2.77 2.79 2.30 2.58 3.28
(0.56) (0.54) (0.53) (0.26) (0.24) (0.54) (0.55) (1.17)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)2 -3.22
(0.86)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)3 -1.97
(3.65)
gas price minus ethanol price) -0.49
(0.60)
ln(number flex-fuel vehicles) 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(number ethanol stations) -0.13 -0.18 -0.19 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.14
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
month 1 of operation -0.99 -0.91 -0.90 -0.91 -0.91 -0.95 -0.99
(0.21) (0.14) (0.12) (0.22) (0.13) (0.21) (0.21)
month 2 of operation -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.17 -0.12 -0.14
(0.16) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16) (0.16)
month 3 of operation -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.00
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
month 4 of operation 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
station-specific quadratic trend x x x x x
county-specific quadratic trend x
month dummies x x x x x x
number observations 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332
number of stations 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201
R-squared 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.30 0.36 0.35
first-order correlation of residuals -0.27 -0.24 -0.23 -0.22 -0.18 -0.25 -0.27 -0.27
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Note: Dependent variable is logged monthly ethanol sales volume in gallons. Logged price variables have been normalized to equal
zero at sample mean prices. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by station. Regressions control for station effects through
first differencing. Regressions do not include a constant term, which is removed by first differencing. Regression (1) is identical to the
linear first-difference regression above in table 2.2 and is included for comparison. Regression (2) replaces the station-specific quadratic
trend with a county-specific quadratic trend. Regression (3) drops all quadratic trends. Regression (4) drops month dummy variables.
Regression (5) drops all time controls. Regression (6) drops station and county characteristics. Regression (7) is identical to the cubic
first-difference regression above in table 2.2. Regression (8) adds the retail gasoline minus ethanol price. First-order correlation of
residuals is the coefficient from the least-squares regression of residuals on their lagged values. See text for details.
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Table 2.7: Estimation results—dynamic responses
Fixed effects First differences
Variable L0 L1 L2 L3 L0 L1 L2 L3
ln(price ethanol) 0.48 1.06 1.09 1.43 0.77 0.86 0.97 1.16
(0.64) (0.60) (0.64) (0.69) (0.48) (0.47) (0.53) (0.54)
ln(price ethanol)t−1 -0.62 -0.26 -0.37 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20
(0.77) (0.76) (0.81) (0.59) (0.57) (0.60)
ln(price ethanol)t−2 -0.59 -0.03 -0.12 0.08
(0.66) (0.77) (0.63) (0.56)
ln(price ethanol)t−3 -0.10 0.25
(0.76) (0.59)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)1 2.60 2.57 2.59 2.86 2.41 2.46 2.63 2.77
(0.64) (0.57) (0.59) (0.63) (0.56) (0.59) (0.61) (0.67)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)1t−1 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.23 0.19 0.20
(0.78) (0.78) (0.81) (0.62) (0.63) (0.65)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)1t−2 -0.15 0.24 0.05 0.26
(0.63) (0.72) (0.62) (0.56)
ln(gas price / ethanol price)1t−3 0.29 0.46
(0.72) (0.56)
number observations 5027 4332 3843 3462 4332 3843 3462 3161
number of stations 237 201 174 156 201 174 156 140
R-squared 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.28
ln(price ethanol) cumulative 0.48 0.44 0.24 0.92 0.77 0.64 0.65 1.29
(0.64) (1.17) (1.70) (2.27) (0.48) (0.82) (1.25) (1.34)
ln(gas price/ethanol price) cumulative 2.60 2.84 2.71 3.51 2.41 2.70 2.87 3.69
(0.64) (1.11) (1.59) (2.12) (0.56) (0.95) (1.32) (1.48)
first-order correlation of residuals 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 -0.27 -0.31 -0.33 -0.35
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Note: Dependent variable is logged monthly ethanol sales volume in gallons. Logged price variables have been normalized to equal
zero at sample mean prices. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by station. Fixed-effects regressions use deviations from
within-station means to control for station effects. First-difference regressions do not include a constant term, which is removed by
first differencing. All regressions include logged number of flexible-fuel vehicles in county, logged number of ethanol stations in
county, dummy variables for months 1-4 of operation, month dummy variables, and station-specific quadratic trends. Accumulated
price responses near the bottom of the table are long-run elasticities given by the sum of the coefficients on the current and lagged price
variables. First-order correlation of residuals is the coefficient from the least-squares regression of residuals on their lagged values. See
text for details.
CHAPTER III
The Market for Flexible-Fuel Vehicles That Burn Ethanol
3.1 Background
Estimating the cost of regulation is difficult. Few regulations allow trading that could
reveal compliance costs through transaction prices, and regulated firms often have lit-
tle incentive to report costs truthfully. Some regulations, however, feature “loopholes”
that allow firms to relax regulatory constraints. When the cost of using a loophole is
known, researchers can infer the marginal cost of regulation indirectly for firms that ex-
ploit the loophole. My coauthor and I demonstrate that firms in the auto industry reveal
the marginal cost of complying with fuel-economy standards when they exploit a loophole
that overstates the efficiency of “flexible-fuel” vehicles. Using this approach, we estimate
that tightening fuel-economy standards by one mile per gallon would cost domestic au-
tomakers no more than $10–$30 in profit per vehicle, which is consistent with other recent
attempts to measure these costs directly. Our estimates are significantly less than the fine
of $55 for non-compliance. Researchers have used this fine as a measure of compliance
costs in the past, even though domestic automakers do not pay fines.
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards require automakers to achieve a
minimum average fuel economy across their entire vehicle fleet. Firms whose fleet average
falls below the minimum are subject to a fine. The Alternative Motor Fuels Act (AMFA)
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modified CAFE regulations starting in 1993 by crediting vehicles capable of burning gaso-
line and ethanol with about two-thirds better mileage than they actually achieve. These
vehicles are known as “flexible-fuel” vehicles.1 Automakers can make any conventional
vehicle a flexible-fuel vehicle through a minor modification, which adds only $100–$200
in production cost, as we discuss in detail below. If consumers fill their tanks with gasoline
instead of ethanol, a flexible-fuel vehicle is virtually identical to its gasoline counterpart,
with negligible differences in performance. The flexible-fuel provision therefore offer au-
tomakers a low-cost option for improving fuel economy under CAFE regulations, reduc-
ing the need to make vehicles more efficient by adding costly fuel-saving technology or to
improve average mileage by selling a larger fraction of small vehicles. The flexible-fuel
provision limits the gain in fuel economy that an automaker can achieve using flexible-fuel
vehicles to 1.2 miles per gallon.
The original rationale for the flexible-fuel provision was to solve a classic coordination
problem. Without vehicles that ran on ethanol, it was thought, retailers would have no
incentive to install new fuel pumps for distributing ethanol. Without pumps, consumers
would never demand vehicles that burn the fuel. Policymakers hoped that the flexible-
fuel provision would solve this coordination problem. By inducing automakers to make
flexible-fuel vehicles through a CAFE credit, the provision would put alternative-fuel ve-
hicles on the road, and infrastructure would follow. In reality, ethanol infrastructure has
not kept pace with flexible-fuel production, and few flexible-fuel vehicles ever run on
ethanol. For this reason, the National Academy of Sciences has advocated eliminating the
flexible-fuel provision (National Academy of Sciences 2002), and critics have character-
ized the provision as a harmful loophole. Because the incremental cost of flexible-fuel
capacity is known, however, automakers that exploit this loophole indirectly reveal infor-
1Flexible-fuel vehicles actually run on a fuel blend known as “E85,” which contains 85% pure ethanol and 15% gasoline. We refer
to this fuel as “ethanol” throughout.
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mation about the cost of CAFE standards. The purpose of this chapter is to use this insight
to estimate the cost of marginally tightening CAFE standards for automakers that produce
flexible-fuel vehicles.
We begin by modeling the profit-maximization decision of an oligopolistic automaker.
The automaker faces a fuel-economy constraint but can relax the constraint by producing
flexible-fuel vehicles. The model provides sufficient conditions under which we can infer
the marginal cost of tightening CAFE standards by examining the cost of exploiting the
flexible-fuel loophole. If an automaker is constrained by CAFE standards, has installed
flexible-fuel capacity on some but not all units for some model, and has not exhausted
the maximum gain in fuel economy from producing flexible-fuel vehicles, and if marginal
consumers do not value flexible-fuel capacity, then the automaker will equate the marginal
cost of improving mileage using the flexible-fuel loophole with the marginal cost of im-
proving mileage through other means.
The empirical portion of the chapter demonstrates that these conditions hold for do-
mestic automakers. Using administrative data from the Department of Transportation, we
show that domestic automakers were constrained by CAFE standards and used flexible-
fuel vehicles to comply with the regulations. Domestic automakers rarely added flexible-
fuel capacity to more than one type of vehicle, and unconstrained Japanese automakers
did not produce any flexible-fuel vehicles. These findings are consistent with automak-
ers producing flexible-fuel vehicles to exploit the flexible-fuel loophole. Automakers that
produced flexible-fuel vehicles installed flexible-fuel capacity on some but not all units,
and automakers rarely exceeded the maximum gain in fuel economy permitted under the
provision.
Next, we show that marginal consumers do not value flexible-fuel capacity, using trans-
action data to analyze both prices and quantities for flexible-fuel vehicles. Automakers sell
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a large portion of their flexible-fuel vehicles to consumers living in states with virtually
no ethanol fueling stations. Consumers in these states are almost certainly not willing to
pay more for flexible-fuel vehicles, since they are not able to purchase ethanol. Further-
more, our analysis of transaction prices for flexible-fuel vehicles and comparable gasoline-
only vehicles indicates that consumers do not pay more for flexible-fuel capacity, which
is consistent with survey evidence that most flexible-fuel owners do not know they own
flexible-fuel vehicles.
Because marginal consumers do not value flexible-fuel capacity, and because domestic
automakers have exploited the flexible-fuel loophole without exhausting it, the flexible-
fuel provision reveals the cost of marginally increasing CAFE standards. The cost of
CAFE is a function of vehicle fuel economy and the cost of adding flexible-fuel capacity.
Incremental production costs for flexible-fuel vehicles reportedly range from $100–$200
or lower. For automakers that produce flexible-fuel vehicles to comply with CAFE stan-
dards, this range implies that the marginal cost of tightening the standard for light trucks
by one mile per gallon is no more than $11–$28 in lost profit per vehicle. The cost of
tightening the standard for passenger cars is no more than $8–$18. Because the automaker
equates the marginal costs of alternative compliance strategies, our cost estimates also re-
flect lower profit margins on smaller, more efficient vehicles, as well as the gap between
incremental production costs and willingness to pay for fuel-saving modifications. Costs
are substantially lower than the $55 fine that automakers would pay if they failed to comply
with CAFE standards, which serves as an upper bound on marginal compliance costs.
Our estimate of the marginal cost of tightening CAFE standards is almost identical
to recent estimates by Jacobson (2007), who uses a wholly different methodology. Ja-
cobson measures compliance costs by directly estimating demand elasticities and implied
marginal costs, in contrast to our loophole approach. We find the similarity of his and our
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results reassuring.
Our estimates should prove useful in any analysis of the costs of CAFE standards or
the benefits of allowing trading of CAFE credits across firms. Our estimates would also
be useful in research comparing CAFE to policy alternatives, such as a gasoline tax or fee-
bates, which impose fees on inefficient vehicles and offer rebates for efficient ones.2 More
broadly, our approach can inform research measuring the cost of regulation in other indus-
tries. A prominent example is “incentive zoning.” Zoning regulations typically constrain
the height and density of new buildings in a jurisdiction. Under incentive zoning, these
constraints are relaxed if developers provide open space, affordable housing, or other pub-
lic goods.3 Following our methodology, researchers could estimate the marginal cost to
developers of changing height or density restrictions by quantifying how much developers
spend on plazas or affordable housing.
Our analysis of the market for flexible-fuel vehicles also contributes to the policy debate
and growing literature on alternative fuels policies. Congress renewed the flexible-fuel
provision, in spite of the provision’s critics, as part of the 2005 energy bill. Liu and Helfand
(2008) demonstrate that the flexible-fuel incentive likely increases gasoline consumption
and greenhouse emissions because it allows automakers to make inefficient vehicles, but
that increasing the incentive could actually reduce production of flexible-fuel vehicles.
They do not use the flexible-fuel incentive to estimate the cost of complying with CAFE.
The 2005 energy bill also established a renewable fuel standard, which Congress greatly
expanded in 2007. The second chapter of this dissertation estimates ethanol demand by
owners of flexible-fuel vehicles and uses the demand estimates to evaluate the welfare
2Liu and Helfand (2008) assume marginal compliance costs are $55 in their analysis of AMFA, and Goldberg (1998) assumes that
marginal compliance costs are zero if an automaker does not pay a fine and $55 if it does. These analyses could be improved using our
estimates.
3Incentive zoning began in Chicago and New York City, where developers were allowed to exceed height restrictions and density
limitations on buildings if they provided plaza space on the lot (Weiss 1992; Morris 2000). At least half of all cities and towns with
zoning laws reportedly have some incentive zoning program (Morris 2000).
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implications of the expanded renewable fuel standard.
The format of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 models an automaker’s decision to
use the flexible-fuel loophole to relax fuel-economy constraints, discusses which vehicles
automakers will equip with flexible-fuel capacity, and establishes conditions under which
we can infer marginal compliance costs. The next several sections demonstrate that these
conditions hold empirically.
Section 3.3 shows that domestic automakers use flexible-fuel vehicles to comply with
CAFE standards, that they install flexible-fuel capacity on some but not all units for their
flexible-fuel models, and that they have not exhausted the flexible-fuel loophole. Section
3.3 also shows that the set of vehicles we observe with flexible-fuel capacity is broadly
consistent with our model’s predictions. Section 3.4 argues that marginal consumers do
not value flexible-fuel capacity. Section 3.5 then uses publicly reported estimates of the
incremental cost of producing a flexible-fuel vehicle to calculate the marginal cost of com-
plying with fuel-economy standards.
3.2 Revealing the cost of fuel-economy standards
3.2.1 Profit-maximizing automaker
We assume that an oligopolistic automaker complying with fuel-economy standards
maximizes profits with respect to the prices, mileage, and flexible-fuel shares of the models
it produces:
(3.1) - = 5
j∈M
(




I(3 j > 0) · Fj
where: M is the set of models the automaker produces; p j is the price the automaker
charges for model j; m j is the model’s fuel economy in miles per gallon; q j is its sales
quantity, which depends on the prices p and mileage m for all models of all producers;
c j is the constant marginal cost of the gasoline-only version of the model, which depends
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on the model’s mileage; 3 j ∈ [0,1] is the model’s flexible-fuel share, or the fraction of
units with flexible-fuel capacity; % j is the incremental production cost of outfitting one
such unit with flexible-fuel capacity; and Fj is the fixed cost of engineering the model to
have flexible-fuel capacity, which the automaker pays if the model’s flexible-fuel share
exceeds zero, as denoted by the indicator function I(3 j > 0). Profits equal the sum over
all models of price minus average variable cost multiplied by quantity, minus engineering
fixed costs.4 Following previous studies in this literature we assume that the set of models
is fixed.
It is convenient to interpret % j as the incremental production cost of adding special
components that allow a flexible-fuel vehicle to burn ethanol. In addition to having larger
fuel injectors, flexible-fuel vehicles have fuel-system components made from materials
that are more resistant to the corrosive nature of ethanol. Earlier models also had special
fuel sensors to detect the percent ethanol content of fuel running through the engine. In-
cremental costs vary from model to model, depending on a model’s engine technology and
sales volume.5 Often more important than the hardware changes themselves, however, is
the engineering time and effort needed to add flexible-fuel capacity. In addition to making
minor design changes, outfitting a new model with flexible-fuel capacity requires modi-
fying on-board software, doing additional engine calibration work, and performing extra
emissions testing. These up-front fixed costs can be substantial.
We assume that each model has a unique engine size or technology, leading to a sepa-
rate fixed cost for each model. In reality, different models often share the same engines,
implying substantial overlap in fixed costs. Thus, when we analyze actual flexible-fuel
production below, we focus on flexible-fuel shares for specific engine sizes, which proxy
4We could easily generalize the model by making marginal costs an increasing function of quantity. This would not alter any of the
conclusions, however, and would complicate the notation.
5High sales volumes allow automakers to attract multiple parts suppliers for flexible-fuel components, which can bring down
incremental costs through competition.
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for models with shared fixed costs.
An implicit assumption in the model is that consumers do not care about flexible-fuel
capacity one way or the other. Quantities do not depend on flexible-fuel shares, which
implies, for example, that no consumer would switch from a Honda Accord to a Chevy
Impala if General Motors increased the fraction of Impalas with flexible-fuel capacity.
Similarly, we do not include separate prices for flexible-fuel vehicles and their gasoline-
only counterparts. Since consumers regard the vehicles as perfect substitutes, no consumer
would pay more or less for an Impala with flexible-fuel capacity, and the automaker sets
a single price for all Impalas. In reality, some consumers surely prefer flexible-fuel ve-
hicles, while other consumers may even have a distaste for such vehicles. We think the
fraction of such consumers is small, however, given the dearth of ethanol pumps nation-
wide. We therefore ignore these consumers momentarily and proceed as if no consumer
cared about flexible-fuel capacity. After deriving our results, we argue that our key result—
that flexible-fuel costs reveal the marginal cost tightening CAFE standards—holds as long
as marginal consumers do not value flexible-fuel capacity. Later, we present empirical
evidence that marginal consumers indeed do not value flexible-fuel capacity.
3.2.2 Fuel-economy standards
The automaker faces a fuel-economy constraint that sets a minimum average mileage
for the automaker’s fleet. The constraint features a “loophole” that gives extra credit for












where . is the fuel-economy standard in miles per gallon, m j is the mileage of model j,
& ∈ [0,1] is the incentive for flexible-fuel vehicles, Q = 5 j∈M q j(p,m) is the automaker’s
total sales volume, and all other parameters are as above. The constraint requires that an
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automaker’s AMFA fuel economy—that is, the sales-weighted harmonic-average mileage
of the automaker’s vehicles, calculated using flexible-fuel incentives—exceed the CAFE
standard of .. Equivalently, the constraint prevents sales-weighted average fuel consump-
tion per mile, calculated using flexible-fuel incentives, from exceeding 1/.. Current leg-
islation fixes the flexible-fuel incentive at & ≈ 0.6, giving automakers with binding con-
straints a strong implicit subsidy to produce flexible-fuel vehicles.6 For a sense of how
strong this incentive is, note that adding flexible-fuel capacity increases a vehicle’s effec-
tive mileage by about 1/0.6−1≈ 67%, which amounts to treating a flexible-fuel Hummer
like a Toyota Camry or a flexible-fuel Camry like a Toyota Prius. Increasing a model’s
flexible-fuel share increases average mileage because the standard treats flexible-fuel ve-
hicles as though they achieve better mileage than they actually do.


















which clarifies that flexible-fuel vehicles relax the constraint by reducing sales-weighted
average fuel consumption per mile.
The automaker is limited in its ability to improve fuel economy using the flexible-fuel












where ! > 0 is the limit on using the flexible-fuel incentive, and all other parameters are
as above. This constraint requires that actual sales-weighted harmonic-average mileage
6In practice & = arg +(1−a), where a ∈ [0,1] is the assumed fraction of miles that the vehicle drives using E85 ethanol, r > 1 is
the ratio of ethanol to gasoline fuel consumption per mile, and g ∈ [0,1] is the assumed gasoline content of E85. The credit’s logic is
that it purports to count only gasoline consumption when determining a vehicle’s contribution toward average fuel economy. Current
legislation fixes a = 0.50, which dramatically overstates the fraction of miles that flexible-fuel vehicles actually run on ethanol, and sets
g = 0.15, which is the fraction gasoline content of E85. In practice r varies slightly among flexible-fuel vehicles, averaging about 1.35,
which implies that flexible-fuel vehicles achieve about 35% higher fuel economy on gasoline or 1-1/1.35 = 25% lower fuel economy
on ethanol. We assume for simplicity that r is the same for all vehicles so that & is also the same for all vehicles.
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exceed the less-stringent standard of .−! < ., or that sales-weighted average fuel con-
sumption per mile not exceed 1/(.−!) > 1/.. Equivalently, the constraint requires that
the automaker’s actual fuel economy not fall short of the nominal fuel-economy standard
by more than ! miles per gallon. Legislation fixes this limit at ! = 1.2 miles per gallon.7
It is helpful to think of the automaker as solving a two-stage maximization problem.
First, the automaker pays the fixed costs to engineer flexible-fuel capacity on whichever
models it chooses. Then the automaker sets flexible-fuel shares for these models. Variable
profits in the second stage depend on the combination of models engineered to be flexible-
fuel capable in the first stage. Thus, the automaker chooses this combination of models
optimally in the first stage to maximize second-stage variable profits minus first-stage fixed
costs. We remain agnostic as to the competitive behavior automakers use to arrive at an
equilibrium in vehicle prices, quantities, and fuel economy. We simply assume that some
equilibrium mapping from prices and mileage to sales quantities exists and that automakers
choose flexible-fuel shares optimally given this mapping.









































where / and µ are the shadow prices on the constraints, all other variables are as above, and
we have suppressed the arguments of functions for convenience. Flexible-fuel shares are
choice variables only for models on which the automaker has paid the fixed engineering
costs; flexible-fuel shares are zero for other models. When the constraints are binding, the
7It is strange that the standard regulates fuel consumption per mile, yet caps the flexible-fuel incentive in miles per gallon. For
automakers that have a binding fuel-economy constraint, however, the two are equivalent. It is similarly strange that penalties for non-
compliance scale proportionally with miles per gallon below the standard. This implies that the penalty per gallon of fuel consumption
is higher in the passenger car fleet, which has a higher fuel-economy standard.
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shadow prices implicitly tax inefficient models and subsidize efficient models. The shadow
prices also quantify the marginal cost, in terms of lower profits, resulting from tighter
fuel-economy standards. Equivalently, the shadow prices quantify the marginal benefit of
looser standards. We estimate the first of these shadow prices by examining the loophole
for flexible-fuel vehicles. This shadow price is revealed by the first-order conditions for
flexible-fuel shares immediately below. We show empirically that the second shadow price
is usually zero.
3.2.3 First-order conditions for flexible-fuel shares






where qk factors out of both terms, and M is the automaker’s sales-weighted harmonic-
average mileage calculated using flexible-fuel incentives, which is given by the first term
in equation (3.2). This first-order condition holds with equality for models whose flexible-
fuel shares are strictly greater than zero and strictly less than one. At corner solutions
the equality becomes an inequality. The first term is the incremental cost of flexible-fuel
capacity. In the second term, & is the share of a flexible-fuel vehicle’s fuel consumption
per mile that contributes toward the automaker’s fleet average, so (1− &)/(mkQ) is the
reduction in average fuel consumption per mile that the automaker achieves when it adds
flexible-fuel capacity to another unit. Multiplying by M2 converts this value to a marginal
improvement in mileage, while multiplying by the shadow price on the first constraint /
converts this improvement into dollars of marginal benefits. The automaker simply equates
the incremental cost of flexible-fuel capacity with the marginal benefit of a flexible-fuel
vehicle in terms of relaxing the first constraint.
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Note that the assumption that consumers ignore flexible-fuel capacity is critical here.
If consumers valued flexible-fuel capacity, then this first-order condition would contain
additional terms reflecting marginal revenue changes.
The first-order conditions for flexible-fuel shares reveal the shadow price on the first
constraint, which is the key insight of this chapter. Rearranging equation (3.6) gives:




which holds with equality for models at an interior flexible-fuel share. The shadow price /
on the first constraint equals the incremental cost of adding flexible-fuel capacity divided
by the corresponding improvement in AMFA fuel economy that flexible-fuel capacity af-
fords. The automaker equates the marginal benefit of relaxing the constraint with the
marginal cost of relaxing the constraint using the flexible-fuel loophole. This equation
holds regardless of whether the second constraint is binding or not. Again, at corner solu-
tions this equality becomes an inequality.
While our mathematical model assumes that consumers do not value flexible-fuel ca-
pacity, the key result in equation (3.7) will hold as long as marginal consumers do not
value flexible-fuel capacity. That is, suppose that prices for flexible-fuel vehicles and their
gasoline counterparts are the same in equilibrium, and that sales quantities do not change
when an automaker marginally increases the flexible-fuel share on one of its flexible-fuel
models. Then a constrained automaker will still equate the marginal cost of a flexible-fuel
vehicle with the marginal benefit in terms of relaxing the first constraint, even if some
consumers prefer flexible-fuel vehicles or have a distaste for flexible-fuel capacity. We
demonstrate in section 3.4 below that marginal consumers indeed do not value flexible-
fuel capacity.
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3.2.4 Revealing marginal compliance costs
If an automaker produces flexible-fuel vehicles to comply with CAFE standards, is at an
interior flexible-fuel share for some model, and does not exhaust the flexible-fuel loophole,
and if in equilibrium marginal consumers do not value flexible-fuel capacity, then we are
able to pin down the cost of marginally tightening CAFE standards. Differentiating the
automaker’s Lagrangian in equation (3.5) at the optimum with respect to the nominal fuel-





Assuming the automaker does not exhaust the flexible-fuel loophole, the shadow price on
the backstop constraint µ is zero, and we can ignore the second term. Marginal compliance
costs then equal the shadow price on the first constraint only. It does not matter on the
margin whether the limit on on using the flexible-fuel loophole ! changes or stays the
same, as the backstop constraint is not binding.8
Substituting for the shadow price using equation (3.7) and then dividing by total pro-






=− %k · mk
(1−&).2 ,
where we have replaced average mileage M with the fuel-economy standard . because the
first constraint is binding. Marginal compliance costs are then a simple function of mileage
and the incremental cost of adding flexible-fuel capacity for any model with an interior
flexible-fuel share. The automaker equates the marginal cost of relaxing the constraint
using the flexible-fuel loophole with the marginal cost of relaxing the constraint through
other means, such as by directly improving mileage or by selling a larger share of small
8Note that we calculate the marginal cost of tightening the CAFE standard . while holding the limit on using the flexible-fuel
loophole ! constant. Other policy changes are possible and in general have different costs. For example, the marginal cost of reducing
the limit ! is µ, which we are not able to estimate using our methodology. The marginal cost of tightening the CAFE standard . while
holding backstop fuel economy .−! constant is /, regardless of whether the backstop is binding or not.
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vehicles. Constrained automakers that exploit the flexible-fuel loophole therefore reveal
their marginal compliance costs, as long as they do not exhaust the loophole by running
up against the backstop constraint. If the backstop constraint were binding, then marginal
compliance costs would also depend on the second shadow price, which we are not able
to estimate using our methodology.
Observe that / is the marginal benefit of relaxing the first constraint, which sets a
minimum AMFA fuel economy. Note, however, that AMFA fuel economy differs from
actual fuel economy, as is clear from the first constraint in equation (3.3). Thus, while
our methodology yields the marginal cost of improving AMFA fuel economy, it does not
necessarily give the marginal cost of improving actual fuel economy, which may be a
parameter of interest. While not exact, however, our estimates closely approximate the
marginal cost of improving actual fuel economy when the automaker produces a small
number of flexible-fuel vehicles. This is clear from the constraint in equation (3.3), where
the difference between AMFA fuel economy and actual fuel economy shrinks to zero with
sales quantities for flexible-fuel vehicles.
More formally, suppose the automaker produces only one type of vehicle. Then the







where m is the automaker’s actual mileage, 3 is its flexible-fuel share, and the first term





or the marginal benefit of relaxing the constraint by improving actual mileage, which the
automaker will set equal to marginal costs. Suppose that 3 is small, say 0.15, which is
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the maximum flexible-fuel share for a binding light-truck standard of . = 20.7 miles per
gallon and maximum fuel economy gain of ! = 1.2 miles per gallon. Then the marginal
cost of improving actual fuel economy exceeds the marginal cost of improving AMFA fuel
economy by a factor of just 1/[0.15 ·0.6+(1−0.15)]≈ 1.06. The maximum flexible-fuel
share for cars is even lower than 0.15, and in practice flexible-fuel shares average less than
0.06 during our study period.
There are two cases in which we are able to bound marginal compliance costs, even
though we are unable to infer costs precisely. First, if the backstop constraint is binding,
then the cost of improving fuel economy using the flexible-fuel loophole gives a lower
bound on marginal compliance costs. The shadow price on the backstop constraint is
nonzero, and while no first-order condition reveals this shadow price, it must be positive.
Because the automaker complies with the fuel-economy standard and does not pay fines,
we also know that costs are bounded above by the level of the fine.9 Second, if a con-
strained automaker produces no flexible-fuel vehicles, and if fixed engineering costs are
zero, then the cost of improving fuel economy using flexible-fuel vehicles gives an upper
bound on marginal compliance costs. The shadow price on the backstop is zero, but the
first-order conditions for flexible-fuel shares do not hold with equality. This upper bound
on marginal compliance costs does not hold for a general model with fixed costs for adding
flexible-fuel capacity.
3.2.5 Which models get flexible-fuel capacity?
In general, the combination of models with flexible-fuel capacity depends on fuel-
economy standards, fixed and incremental costs for flexible-fuel vehicles, consumer de-
mand, and production costs for different models of varying efficiency. Nevertheless, some
9Technically, not complying with CAFE standards is a civil infraction. Some analysts suggest that domestic automakers fear that
breaking the law would make them liable for damages to stockholders, meaning that the cost of non-compliance may exceed the $55
fine (Kleit 2002). Jacobson (2007) models this legal risk and potential loss of reputation as a fixed cost of non-compliance.
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generic results are possible. We begin by assuming that the automaker has already paid
the fixed engineering costs on some subset of models. What can we say about flexible-fuel
shares for this subset?
Returning to equation (3.7), note that the first-order conditions at corners imply that
the shadow price on the first constraint is less than incremental costs per mileage gain
for models whose flexible-fuel shares are zero. The shadow price exceeds incremental
costs per mileage gain for models whose flexible-fuel shares are one. These observations
imply a particular ordering of flexible-fuel shares by incremental costs. Focusing on the
subset of models on which the automaker has paid the fixed engineering costs, suppose
that some model has a nonzero flexible-fuel share. Then any other model with a lower
incremental cost per fuel consumption in gallons per mile will have a flexible-fuel share
of one. Similarly, if any model has an interior flexible-fuel share, any other model with
a higher incremental cost per fuel consumption will have a flexible-fuel share of zero. In
other words, the automaker begins installing flexible-fuel capacity on a new model only
after installing flexible-fuel capacity on all units for models that have lower incremental
costs per fuel consumption.10 The intuition for this result is simple. A flexible-fuel vehi-
cle’s impact on average efficiency is proportional to the vehicle’s fuel consumption. The
automaker simply adds flexible-fuel capacity in order of ascending cost per impact. Note
that if incremental costs are the same for all models or increase less than proportionally
with fuel consumption, then the automaker will install flexible-fuel capacity on its most
inefficient vehicles first.
Clearly, if the flexible-fuel share for any model is zero in the second stage, then the
automaker would never have chosen to pay the fixed engineering costs in the first place.
10Formally, suppose that %k/(1/mk) < %l/(1/ml) and that 3l > 0. Then it must be that 3k = 1. Why? Suppose instead that 3k < 1.
Then the first-order conditions imply that / ≤ %kQ/((1/mk)(1− &)M2), since 3k < 1, and that / ≥ %lQ/((1/ml)(1− &)M2), since
3l > 0. This implies that %l/(1/ml) ≤ %k/(1/mk), which is a contradiction. By similar arguments, if % j/(1/m j) > %i/(1/mi) and
3i ∈ (0,1), then 3 j = 0.
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This leads to a brief discussion of fixed costs and the combination of models engineered
to receive flexible-fuel capacity. If fixed costs for flexible-fuel vehicles are zero, then the
automaker’s two-stage maximization problem reduces to the second-stage problem above.
The automaker simply adds flexible-fuel capacity in order of ascending incremental cost
per fuel consumption, as we show above.
Suppose instead that fixed costs are positive but that the automaker could fully exploit
the flexible-fuel incentive for any single model outfitted with flexible-fuel capacity. That
is, for any single model engineered to have flexible-fuel capacity, optimal second-stage
behavior would have the automaker producing an interior flexible-fuel share, either be-
cause extra flexible-fuel vehicles were no longer useful to meet the first CAFE constraint
or because the automaker was up against the backstop constraint. Then, if the automaker
produces any flexible-fuel vehicles at all, it will install flexible-fuel capacity only on one
model, irrespective of fixed costs. Why? Suppose the automaker paid the fixed cost on
two or more models. The results above tell us that the automaker would apply flexible-
fuel capacity in order of ascending cost per fuel consumption. Given the assumption that
any single model is sufficient, the automaker would never apply flexible-fuel capacity to
a second model, and it never would have paid the fixed costs in the first place. If we ad-
ditionally assume that fixed costs are the same for all models, then the automaker would
only install flexible-fuel capacity on the model with the lowest incremental cost per fuel
consumption. Any substitute vehicle would have the same fixed cost, by assumption, but
the same gain in fuel economy would be more costly for other models, which have higher
incremental costs per fuel consumption.
The assumptions and qualifications above hint at several additional points. First, the
gain in variable profit from installing flexible-fuel capacity on any single model must ex-
ceed its corresponding fixed cost, otherwise the automaker could not justify paying the
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fixed cost. This point holds more generally. For any optimal combination of models with
flexible-fuel capacity, the loss in variable profit from excluding any subgroup of models
must exceed the subgroup’s collective fixed costs, by the definition of an optimum.
Second, automakers will clearly avoid installing flexible-fuel capacity on models with
especially high fixed costs, even if incremental production costs are low. Similarly, low
fixed costs can compensate for high incremental costs.
Finally, automakers will tend to avoid installing flexible-fuel capacity on models whose
sales volumes are low, even if such models have relatively low fixed or incremental pro-
duction costs. Suppose, for example, that a model’s sales share were near zero. Then even
if the automaker installed flexible-fuel capacity on every unit, the impact on average fuel
economy would be negligible. This is clear from the constraint in equation (3.3), where
the impact of flexible-fuel capacity is weighted by a model’s sales share. The automaker
might rather install flexible-fuel capacity on a model with high fixed costs but higher sales
volume than pay fixed costs on a model yielding such a negligible gain in average mileage.
Sales volumes also influence the decision to install flexible-fuel capacity in the first place.
Small automakers may be unable to justify producing any flexible-fuel vehicles if sales
volumes and profits are low relative to fixed engineering costs.
3.2.6 Additional considerations
Actual fuel-economy standards are more complicated than we describe above. First,
automakers also receive extra credit for vehicles that burn natural gas, electricity, and
other alternative fuels. These vehicles all contribute toward the backstop limit of 1.2 miles
per gallon. We could model these vehicles explicitly, but it would not change our key
result that the incremental cost of installing flexible-fuel capacity reveals marginal com-
pliance costs for automakers satisfying the conditions we set forth. In practice, automak-
ers produce few alternative-fuel vehicles besides flexible-fuel vehicles. Because ethanol
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flexible-fuel vehicles can use existing gasoline infrastructure, and because incremental
costs are relatively low, flexible-fuel vehicles have proven more attractive to automakers
than natural-gas or electric vehicles.
Second, fuel-economy standards regulate light-duty trucks and passenger cars sepa-
rately. The nominal fuel-economy standard for passenger cars is 27.5 miles per gallon,
while the standard for light trucks is 20.7 for most of our study period. Both fleets qual-
ify for the same flexible-fuel incentive, and the limit of 1.2 miles per gallon applies to
both fleets separately. Mathematically, this implies a constraint on AMFA fuel economy
and corresponding shadow price for each fleet, as well as a backstop constraint and cor-
responding shadow price for each fleet. Weights are then given by by a model’s sales
share within its respective fleet. In what follows we distinguish between light-truck and
passenger-car fleets. Each of the above results applies separately to the passenger-car and
light-truck fleets.11
Finally, fuel-economy regulations allow “banking” and “borrowing.” An automaker
that exceeds the standard in one year earns credits that it can use to comply in an earlier
or future year. For example, if an automaker falls short of the standard, it can use banked
credits from a previous year to avoid paying fines. Banked credits expire after three years.
If the automaker does not have banked credits, it can borrow credits in the short term and
earn the credits back in a subsequent year. It must earn the credits back within three years
to avoid paying fines.12 Fines are $55 for every mile per gallon below the standard and
scale with total production. Credits earned for light trucks can not be applied to passenger
cars, and vice-versa.
11Fuel-economy standards also regulate domestic and import passenger cars separately. This distinction is not thought to be partic-
ularly important for present-day automakers (see Jacobson (2007)). The one possible exception is Chrysler, which from 1999–2007
produced import passenger-car vehicles through its European subsidiary Mercedes-Benz and paid CAFE fines on this fleet in 2004–
2006. Chrysler separated from Mercedes starting in 2008.
12Moreover, a model’s “year” is itself a choice parameter that automakers can manipulate to comply with fuel-economy regulations.
For example, suppose that Ford’s lineup of trucks for the 2008 model year was relatively efficient. Ford could stop selling the 2007
version of its gas-guzzling Excursion early in the 2007 calendar year, and begin selling the 2008 version to include with its relatively
efficient 2008 models.
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3.3 Automakers exploit the flexible-fuel loophole
Recall from the previous section that we are able to infer the marginal cost of complying
with CAFE standards as long as four conditions hold. First, constrained automakers must
exploit the flexible-fuel loophole to comply with CAFE standards. Second, automakers
must offer a model with an interior flexible-fuel share. Third, automakers must not exhaust
the flexible-fuel loophole by hitting the backstop constraint. Fourth, and finally, marginal
consumers must not value flexible-fuel capacity. We demonstrate that the first, second,
and third of these conditions hold using administrative data from the Department of Trans-
portation’s National Highway Safety and Transportation Administration (NHTSA). These
data record model names, production quantities, AMFA fuel economy, actual fuel econ-
omy, fuel type, and other vehicle attributes by model year. NHTSA collects these data to
determine whether firms comply with CAFE standards. We demonstrate that the fourth
condition holds using vehicle transaction data below.
3.3.1 Constrained automakers exploit the flexible-fuel loophole to comply with CAFE standards but
do not exhaust the loophole
Table 3.1 summarizes fuel-economy performance and flexible-fuel production across
automakers during 1993–2006. For both passenger-car and light-truck fleets, the table
shows an automaker’s actual fleet-average fuel economy ignoring the flexible-fuel incen-
tive, the difference between actual fuel economy and the fuel-economy standard, the frac-
tion of the automaker’s vehicles that are flexible-fuel vehicles, and whether the automaker
pays fines during 1993–2006. The table also shows each automaker’s total production and
market share during this time period, as well as the fraction of each automaker’s produc-
tion that is light trucks.
Automakers produce flexible-fuel vehicles only when necessary to comply with fuel-
economy standards. Table 3.1 shows that all three domestic automakers produced vehicles
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Table 3.1: Fuel-economy performance and flexible-fuel production 1993–2006
























GM 27.9 0.4 0.0 no 20.5 -0.3 5.2 no 61.0 29.0 44.8
Ford 27.2 -0.3 2.5 no 20.3 -0.4 5.8 no 47.6 22.6 53.0
Chrysler 27.3 -0.2 0.9 yes 20.5 -0.3 6.0 no 33.3 15.8 65.8
European
VW 28.8 1.3 0.0 no 19.9 -0.9 0.0 yes 3.9 1.8 3.4
BMW 25.8 -1.7 0.0 yes 20.6 -0.3 0.0 yes 2.6 1.2 13.4
Volvo 25.7 -1.8 0.0 yes 0.5 0.2 0.0
Porsche 23.8 -3.7 0.0 yes 18.5 -2.4 0.0 yes 0.3 0.1 18.3
Japanese
Toyota 31.0 3.5 0.0 no 22.6 1.8 0.0 no 21.8 10.3 38.2
Honda 32.0 4.5 0.0 no 25.0 4.1 0.0 no 14.9 7.1 23.2
Nissan 29.1 1.6 0.0 no 21.5 0.7 1.8 no 11.0 5.2 39.0
Total 28.6 1.1 0.6 20.8 0.1 4.5 210.7 100.0 45.1
Note: Table summarizes fuel-economy performance and flexible-fuel production during the 1993–2006 model years. Actual MPG
is sales-weighted harmonic-average mileage ignoring flexible-fuel incentives. Fuel economy in excess of the standard is based on
sales-weighted standards because the light-truck standard is increasing over time. Table omits several small European automakers with
market shares less than 0.1% (e.g., Ferrari) and eight Japanese automakers automakers with market shares ranging from 0.1%–1.6%.
(e.g., Hyundai and Subaru). Table does not distinguish between domestic and import passenger-car fleets; all fines for passenger cars
were for imports. Chrysler includes Mercedes-Benz for 1999–2006. See text for details.
whose average fuel economy was below the standard during 1993–2006, and all three
domestic automakers produced flexible-fuel vehicles. The only domestic fleet above the
standard was the General Motors passenger-car fleet, and General Motors did not produce
any flexible-fuel cars. In general, the domestic automakers would have paid fines based on
their actual fuel economy but did not, thanks to the incentive for flexible-fuel vehicles.13
This evidence suggests that automakers only produce flexible-fuel vehicles to comply with
fuel-economy standards, which is consistent with statements by automakers that flexible-
fuel production would fall dramatically if the incentive were eliminated (U.S. Department
of Transportation et al. 2002).
Full-line Japanese automakers, such as Honda and Toyota, exceed fuel-economy stan-
13The only domestic automaker to pay fines was Chrysler, which produced flexible-fuel vehicles but still paid fines on its import
passenger-car fleet. Chrysler’s import passenger-car fleet is dominated by Mercedes-Benz, which consistently paid fines prior to
merging with Chrysler in 1999.
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dards and never produce flexible-fuel vehicles. In fact, the only Japanese automaker that
produces flexible-fuel vehicles is Nissan, which did not produce flexible-fuel vehicles un-
til 2005–2006 when its actual fuel economy fell below the light-truck standard for the first
time, as we show below. This evidence suggests that adding flexible-fuel capacity does not
increase profitability in the absence of a binding fuel-economy constraint and the flexible-
fuel provision. If the value of adding flexible-fuel capacity exceeded its incremental cost in
the present market equilibrium, we would expect Toyota and Honda to offer models with
flexible-fuel capacity, assuming the gain in variable profits exceeded flexible-fuel fixed
costs. Below we present evidence that marginal consumers are not willing to pay more for
vehicles with flexible-fuel capacity.
While European automakers consistently fall short of fuel-economy standards and reg-
ularly pay fines, they do not produce flexible-fuel vehicles. This is not surprising. Euro-
pean sales volumes are low, especially for light trucks. For example, Volkswagen has less
than 2% market share in the United States, and its trucks account for just 3% of its U.S.
imports, while BMW has about 1% market share and 13.4% of its vehicles are trucks. As
we note above, fixed engineering costs act as a barrier to installing flexible-fuel capacity
when an automaker has low sales volumes. Moreover, while the European automakers
could reduce fines by producing flexible-fuel vehicles, in many cases they could not avoid
paying fines entirely. Porsche, for example, fell short of the passenger-car standard by 3.7
miles per gallon and could only improve its fuel economy by 1.2 miles per gallon using
flexible-fuel incentives. Thus, marginal compliance costs for these automakers would still
equal fines for non-compliance.
Figures 3.1–3.4 provide more detail by plotting AMFA fuel economy calculated using
flexible-fuel incentives, actual fuel economy, and fuel-economy standards over time for
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automakers that produce flexible-fuel vehicles.14 The figures make clear that domestic
automakers regularly depend on flexible-fuel vehicles to comply with fuel-economy stan-
dards. For example, Chrysler would have fallen short of the light-truck standard every year
from 1994–2002 were it not for the flexible-fuel loophole, while Ford would have missed
the light-truck standard every year from 1997–2006. Because automakers can bank or
borrow for up to three years, flexible-fuel vehicles that increase fuel economy in a year
in which an automaker is already above the standard may still be valuable. For exam-
ple, Chrysler’s flexible-fuel cars in 2003–2005 made up for deficiencies in 2000–2002 and
2006.
Figures 3.1–3.4 also plot the difference between AMFA fuel economy and actual fuel
economy in each year, as well as the limit of ! = 1.2 miles per gallon. NHTSA ignores
any gain in fuel economy above this threshold when calculating an automaker’s compli-
ance in a given year, and an automaker is not able to bank or borrow anything above this
limit. Automakers therefore have no incentive to produce above the limit unless marginal
consumers value flexible-fuel capacity. As expected, automakers rarely exceed this limit.
Chrysler came close with its light-truck fleet in 2002 but did not exceed the limit. Ford
and General Motors briefly exceeded the limit for their light-truck fleets in 2003–2004, but
reduced flexible-fuel shares in 2005. Note that the gain in mileage from using the flexible-
fuel loophole is roughly proportional to the fraction of vehicles with flexible-fuel capacity,
assuming the gain in mileage is relatively small. This implies, for example, that Chrysler,
which gained about 0.5 miles per gallon using the flexible-fuel provision in 2004, could
have roughly doubled its production of flexible-fuel vehicles in 2004 without exceeding
the limit.
In general, the figures show that fuel-economy standards were binding for domestic


































































Figure 3.1: Chrysler fuel economy
Note: Top two figures show AMFA fuel economy and actual fuel economy for Chrysler’s light-truck and passenger-car
fleets for model years 1992–2006. Figures also show fuel-economy standards. AMFA incentives began in 1993. Bottom
two figures show annual increase in fuel economy attributable to AMFA incentives and the 1.2 mile-per-gallon limit.
Regulations ignore any gain above this limit when calculating an automaker’s annual fuel economy. Chrysler merged
with Mercedes-Benz in 1998 and began averaging fuel economy with Mercedes in the 1999 model year. Fuel economy


































































Figure 3.2: Ford fuel economy
Note: Top two figures show AMFA fuel economy and actual fuel economy for Ford’s light-truck and passenger-car fleets
for model years 1992–2006. Figures also show fuel-economy standards. AMFA incentives began in 1993. Bottom
two figures show annual increase in fuel economy attributable to AMFA incentives and the 1.2 mile-per-gallon limit.


































































Figure 3.3: General Motors fuel economy
Note: Top two figures show AMFA fuel economy and actual fuel economy for General Motors light-truck and passenger-
car fleets for model years 1992–2006. Figures also show fuel-economy standards. AMFA incentives began in 1993.
Bottom two figures show annual increase in fuel economy attributable to AMFA incentives and the 1.2 mile-per-gallon


































































Figure 3.4: Nissan fuel economy
Note: Top two figures show AMFA fuel economy and actual fuel economy for Nissan’s light-truck and passenger-car
fleets for model years 1992–2006. Figures also show fuel-economy standards. AMFA incentives began in 1993. Bottom
two figures show annual increase in fuel economy attributable to AMFA incentives and the 1.2 mile-per-gallon limit.
Regulations ignore any gain above this limit when calculating an automaker’s annual fuel economy.
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automakers during 1993–2006 and that automakers would have paid fines were it not for
flexible-fuel vehicles. The figures also show that automakers rarely exhaust the flexible-
fuel loophole. These are two of the four conditions we need to infer marginal compliance
costs by analyzing the cost of exploiting the flexible-fuel loophole.
3.3.2 Automakers are at interior flexible-fuel shares and rarely install flexible-fuel capacity on more
than one model
Our model makes several broad predictions about flexible-fuel shares when automakers
exploit the flexible-fuel loophole to comply with CAFE standards. First, fixed engineering
costs imply that automakers will not install flexible-fuel capacity on multiple models when
any single model is sufficient to take full advantage of the flexible-fuel incentive. Table
3.2 shows that in any given year automakers rarely install flexible-fuel capacity on more
than one engine size per fleet. They never install flexible-fuel capacity on more than two
engine sizes. Engine size serves as a proxy for engine type, which is the relevant “model”
when thinking about fixed engineering costs for flexible-fuel production, as we discuss
above. Once an automaker has engineered an engine to be flexible-fuel capable, it can
apply flexible-fuel capacity to any model that shares the same engine at roughly the same
incremental cost, achieving roughly the same increase in average fuel economy. In some
cases there is a one-to-one relationship between engine size and model name, in which case
the distinction is irrelevant, but some models with different names share the same engines
(e.g., the Ford Explorer and Explorer Sport Trac), and some models are effectively the
same vehicle (e.g., the Ford Explorer and Mercury Mountaineer). Note that automakers
do not necessarily incur fixed engineering costs in every year, as vehicle characteristics
remain largely unchanged between major redesigns.
Our model also predicts that if fixed engineering costs are constant, and if any sin-
gle model is sufficient to exploit the flexible-fuel loophole, then an automaker will install
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Table 3.2: Number of engine sizes with flexible-fuel capacity
Chrysler Chrysler Chrysler Ford Ford General Motors




1999 1/12 1/6 1/9
2000 1/13 1/7 1/10 1/10
2001 1/14 1/6 1/13 1/10
2002 1/15 1/6 2/11 1/12
2003 1/6 1/11 1/15 1/7 2/11 1/10
2004 1/6 2/12 1/11 1/6 1/11 1/12
2005 1/8 2/9 2/13 1/7 1/10 1/11
2006 1/6 2/14 2/7 1/9 1/13
Note: Table shows number of engine sizes that have flexible-fuel capacity for each fleet in each year, as well as the
total number of engine sizes. Table omits fleets with no flexible-fuel vehicles.
flexible-fuel capacity on the model with the lowest incremental cost per fuel consump-
tion. If incremental costs increase less than proportionally with fuel consumption, then
automakers will tend to install flexible-fuel capacity on their most inefficient models. Fi-
nally, automakers will tend to avoid installing flexible-fuel capacity on models with low
sales volumes. Figure 3.5 plots flexible-fuel shares and sales-weighted average fuel con-
sumption per mile by engine size for vehicles produced from 1993–2006. Flexible-fuel
vehicles are not particularly inefficient relative to other vehicles, although there is no rea-
son to expect a strong relationship, given the potential for wide variation in fixed and
incremental production costs across models. Automakers do avoid installing flexible-fuel
capacity on models with low sales volumes. Sales volumes in the figure are proportional to
circle sizes. Note that the figure does not control for the number of years that various mod-
els were offered, however, so sales volumes for some engine sizes may appear artificially
low.
Finally, figure 3.5 indicates that flexible-fuel shares were less than one for all engine
sizes on which automakers installed flexible-fuel capacity from 1993–2006. This is the
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(f) General Motors cars
Figure 3.5: Flexible-fuel shares by engine size and fuel consumption
Note: Figure is based on NHTSA fuel-economy compliance data for 1993–2006 model years. Flexible-fuel share is the
fraction of units for each engine size that has flexible-fuel capacity. Fuel consumption per 100 miles is the sales-weighted
average for each engine size. Circle sizes are proportional to sales. Circle labels are engine sizes in liters. Dark circles
indicate engine sizes with nonzero flexible-fuel shares. Specific models are as follows. For Chrsyler: 3.3L truck is the
Caravan; 4.7L truck is the Durango and Ram Pickup; 2.7L car is the Stratus and Sebring; 3.2L car is the Mercedes C240;
2.6L car is the Mercedes C230. For Ford: 3.0L truck is the Ranger and Mazda B3000; 4.0L truck is the Explorer and
Mountaineer; 5.4L truck is the F150 pickup; 3.0L car is the Taurus and Sable; 4.6L car is the Town Car, Grand Marquis,
and Crown Victoria. For General Motors: 2.2L truck is the S10 and Sonoma; 5.3L truck is the Suburban, Tahoe, Yukon,
Avalanche, Sierra, and Silverado. Compliance data for the 2007 model year and beyond are not yet available.
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summary, automakers respond as predicted to flexible-fuel incentives, and the first three
conditions we need to infer marginal compliance costs hold. It only remains to show that
marginal consumers do not value flexible-fuel capacity.
3.4 Marginal consumers do not value flexible-fuel capacity
We provide empirical evidence based on nearly one-million new vehicle transactions
that marginal consumers do not value flexible-fuel capacity. This is important because
our key result—that constrained automakers equate the marginal cost of improving fuel
economy using flexible-fuel vehicles with the marginal cost of improving fuel economy
through other means—depends on the marginal consumer having zero valuation. When
combined with the evidence we present above that automakers use flexible-fuel vehicles
to comply with CAFE standards, install flexible-fuel capacity on some but not all units for
their flexible-fuel models, and do not exhaust the flexible-fuel loophole, the zero valuation
implies that we can pin down marginal compliance costs exactly.
Rosen (1974) shows that what matters for equilibrium prices in a hedonic framework
is the valuation of marginal agents. We suspect that some consumers would pay more for
a vehicle with flexible-fuel capacity, but that the flexible-fuel loophole leads automakers
to supply flexible-fuel vehicles in sufficiently large quantities that marginal consumers are
indifferent.15 In fact, automakers sell many flexible-fuel vehicles to consumers who have
no access to ethanol, and we estimate that the price premium for flexible-fuel vehicles
is approximately zero. These results imply that marginal consumers indeed do not value
flexible-fuel capacity.
These findings are consistent with evidence that many consumers are unaware that they
own flexible-fuel vehicles, particularly in earlier years. For example, a report by several
15If automakers are able to price discriminate, they may be able to generate revenue from flexible-fuel capacity, even if marginal
consumers are indifferent.
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federal government agencies in 2002 concluded that “many people who have purchased
flexible-fuel vehicles do not know they could use E85” (U.S. Department of Transportation
et al. 2002), and a major ethanol-producing firm found that about 70% of flexible-fuel
vehicle owners surveyed in 2005 did not know they owned flexible-fuel vehicles (Wald
2005).
3.4.1 New vehicle transaction data
Our vehicle transaction data come from an industry source that collects data directly
from a nationally representative sample of dealers. The data contain detailed information
on new vehicle prices and characteristics for millions of transactions from 2000–2007. The
data record sales prices, manufacturer rebates, trade-in prices, and trade-in market values.
This information allows us to adjust prices for manufacturer rebates and any difference
between trade-in prices and actual trade-in market values. Automakers frequently offer
financing incentives instead of manufacturer rebates. We observe interest rates and other
information for dealer-financed transactions, allowing us to control for financing incen-
tives.16 Finally, the data record the calendar date of each transaction and the state in which
the transaction took place, as well as the buyer’s age and gender. Some observations also
include manufacturer-suggested retail prices. We deflate all prices by the consumer price
index for all urban consumers and all items from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
To isolate the value of flexible-fuel capacity, we identify flexible-fuel vehicles and com-
parison vehicles in our transaction data that we observe to be identical along every observ-
able dimension except fuel type. The transaction data include each vehicle’s truncated
vehicle identification number (VIN), which provides information about a vehicle’s make,
16We calculate the value of financing incentives in dealer-financed transactions by comparing a car buyer’s actual stream of monthly
payments to the payment stream she would have faced at a market interest rate. We calculate the actual stream of monthly payments
using the loan’s size, term, and dealer APR. We calculate an alternative stream of payments using the market-average APR for new
car loans through commercial banks from the Federal Reserve Board. The Fed reports average interest rates every three months. We
calculate interest rates for intervening months using linear interpolation. Finally, we calculate the present value of each payment stream
using a 4% annual rate of pure time preference. The value of the financing incentive is the difference between these two present values.
These calculations are identical to Corrado et al. (2006).
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model, model year, body style, number of doors, drive type, transmission, engine dis-
placement, number of cylinders, and aspiration (e.g., turbo-charged). The data also record
each vehicle’s fuel type, distinguishing between gasoline-only vehicles, flexible-fuel ve-
hicles, diesels, gasoline-electric hybrids, and other fuels. We cross-reference these fuel
types with information from the National Ethanol Vehicle Coalition, which gives model
names, model years, engine sizes, and flexible-fuel VIN identifiers (usually the 8th digit
of the VIN) for ethanol-gasoline flexible-fuel vehicles. We omit flexible-fuel models that
do not also appear in the Coalition’s list, as some models in our data are actually natural
gas dual-fuel vehicles.
For the flexible-fuel models that remain we identify comparison gasoline-only vehicles
in our transaction data based on model name, model year, engine size, and other observable
characteristics, including truncated VINs that exclude flexible-fuel VIN identifiers. We
group vehicles into vehicle types based on these observable characteristics. Restricting the
sample to these vehicles gives a preliminary sample size of nearly 900,000 transactions.
About one-quarter of these transactions are for vehicles where we observe a single VIN
or more than two VINs per vehicle type. We omit these observations to minimize the
possibility of unobservable characteristics correlating with flexible-fuel capacity. This
gives a final estimation sample of nearly 666,000 observations.
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for our final sample, while Table 3.4 presents
model names and quantities for flexible-fuel models and comparison vehicles. At the end
of the day, the detailed transaction data allow us to identify and compare, for example, the
price of a gasoline-only 2006 Ford F150 extended-cab pickup with a 5.4L V8 engine and
manual transmission to the price of a flexible-fuel 2006 Ford F150 extended-cab pickup
with a 5.4L V8 engine and manual transmission. The data do not, however, include infor-
mation about various options that may be installed. We investigate whether the value of
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
flexible-fuel vehicle 0.62 0.48 0 1 665887
transaction price 31229.62 8352.92 -10994.38 75002.08 665887
suggested retail price 37139.43 8694.88 0 206606.53 249706
manufacturer rebate 2415.44 2021.8 0 11409.17 665887
inventory days 73.08 85.63 1 805 644291
loan at dealer 0.75 0.43 0 1 576274
interest rate (% APR) 5.51 4.22 0 29.99 427656
down payment 7347.18 7399.25 -10994.01 55054.91 432137
monthly payment 590.1 195.7 13.39 3836.9 427656
loan term (months) 62.44 11.14 12 96 427656
trade-in vehicle 0.51 0.5 0 1 665887
trade-in balance 1347.07 2730.48 -23974.05 30170.07 341293
age of buyer 44.94 13.43 16 107 580964
female buyer 0.27 0.45 0 1 596987
ethanol availability (%) 0.17 0.68 0 8.10 665887
Note: Table shows summary statistics for final estimation sample based on flexible-fuel vehicles and their gasoline-only
counterparts. See text for details.
such options is correlated with flexible-fuel capacity below.
In addition to these transaction data, we collect information on ethanol refueling loca-
tions from the Department of Energy’s Alternative Fuels Data Center. These data record
station addresses. The data do not systematically record open dates, but they do record the
date when each station was added to the database. We assume that these add dates approx-
imate open dates and calculate the total number of ethanol stations in each state in each
month. The Department of Energy began collecting these data in 1995, and new stations
are added regularly, so our calculations based on add dates give a fairly accurate picture of
how ethanol availability evolved during our sample period from 2000–2007. We calculate
percent ethanol availability by dividing by the total number of retail gasoline stations in
each state using information from National Petroleum News.17
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Table 3.4: Flexible-fuel models in the data sample
Model Gasoline-only Flexible-fuel Total
Armada 1,165 1,506 2,671
Aspen 119 565 684
Avalanche 1,473 16,208 17,681
B3000 1,350 773 2,123
Caravan 5,959 13,612 19,571
Cherokee 393 1,311 1,704
Commander 111 667 778
Crown Victoria 85 236 321
Dakota 39 46 85
Durango 2,677 212 2,889
Explorer 41,677 70,855 112,532
Express 65 58 123
F150 26,579 26,322 52,901
Grand Marquis 1,471 4,583 6,054
Impala 796 19,731 20,527
Monte Carlo 17 1,376 1,393
Mountaineer 6,026 4,647 10,673
Ranger 4,355 1,743 6,098
S10 3,245 6,986 10,231
Sable 1,237 37 1,274
Savana 62 12 74
Sebring 4,693 2,180 6,873
Sierra 7,028 4,120 11,148
Silverado 16,801 9,217 26,018
Sonoma 735 1,680 2,415
Stratus 1,872 11 1,883
Suburban 17,112 61,764 78,876
Tahoe 45,605 75,919 121,524
Taurus 8,626 8,574 17,200
Terraza 149 14 163
Titan 19,926 20,342 40,268
Town Car 1,009 2,585 3,594
Town & Country 2,416 10,126 12,542
Uplander 125 46 171
Voyager 1,510 6,565 8,075
Yukon 24,055 40,695 64,750
Total 250,563 415,324 665,887
Note: Table shows flexible-fuel models and quantities in estimation sample. Sample excludes flexible-
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Figure 3.6: Flexible-fuel shares and ethanol availability
Note: Flexible-fuel share is the fraction of vehicles in the estimation sample that have flexible-fuel capacity. Ethanol availability is
the maximum fraction of stations that offer ethanol at any time during 2000–2007. Sizes of circles are proportional to the number of
observations. Figure sets availability to 0.01% for 13 states with zero ethanol stations to be compatible with log scaling. These states
appear along the left-hand side of the figure. California’s peak availability is small but not zero.
3.4.2 Many flexible-fuel vehicle buyers do not have access to ethanol
Our first step is to analyze the relationship between the availability of retail ethanol in a
consumer’s state of residence and the geographic allocation of flexible-fuel vehicles. Our
reasoning is that if a large number of vehicles are sold in states that lack ethanol, it is highly
unlikely that marginal consumers value flexible-fuel capacity. Our analysis indicates that
while there is a positive correlation between ethanol availability and flexible-fuel sales
across states, this relationship is weak.
17Although National Petroleum News reports data annually, we divide by the mean number of retail gasoline stations in each state
from 2000–2006, because the data collection process appears to vary from year to year.
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Figure 3.6 plots flexible-fuel shares and peak ethanol availability by state. We calculate
flexible-fuel shares based on our estimation sample of flexible-fuel vehicles and compar-
ison gasoline-only vehicles. Flexible-fuel shares for these vehicles range from 0.6–0.8
in most states. Flexible-fuel shares are substantially lower in California, where many
flexible-fuel vehicles fail the state’s strict emissions laws, and in Hawaii and Nevada. For
the remaining states there appears to be a slight positive correlation between flexible-fuel
share and ethanol availability, but the correlation is weak. Doubling ethanol’s availability
ten times over only correlates with a 30% increase in flexible-fuel shares, and flexible-fuel
shares are high all over the country.
A full 17% of the flexible-fuel vehicles in our estimation sample sell in states where
there are no ethanol pumps or just a single pump at the end of the sample period, while
more than 86% sell in states where ethanol is available at less than 1% of stations. It is
difficult to imagine that more than a handful of consumers in these states are willing to pay
for flexible-fuel capacity. Thus, automakers deciding on how many flexible-fuel vehicles
to produce must have expected that the price premium for marginal vehicles would be
zero.
We also test the relationship between flexible-fuel quantities and ethanol pumps sta-
tistically. We calculate the flexible-fuel share for each vehicle type in each state in each
year. We also calculate the peak fraction of fueling stations that have an ethanol pump in
each state in each year.18 We then regress flexible-fuel shares on availability, controlling
for vehicle-specific fixed effects. We do not include year controls because vehicle types
already differentiate by model year.
Table 3.5 presents the estimation results. The coefficient on ethanol availability in re-
gression (1) implies that increasing ethanol’s market penetration by 1% correlates with
18Using the mean fraction of fueling stations with an ethanol pump in each year does not alter the results appreciably.
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R-squared (within) 0.02 0.16
Note: Dependent variable is flexible-fuel share within each vehicle-state-year
group. Both regressions include vehicle-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by state.
an increase in flexible-fuel shares of 0.047. This relationship might be biased by unob-
served determinants of flexible-fuel shares across states, such as California’s strict emis-
sions laws. Regression (2), however, which includes state dummy variables, finds a nearly
identical correlation. Flexible-fuel shares correlate with differential changes in ethanol
availability across states over time, as well as with differences in availability across states
in any given year. While these coefficient estimates are consistent with automakers allocat-
ing vehicles based in part on preferences, flexible-fuel shares are high everywhere—even
in states with virtually no ethanol pumps. If automakers are “overproducing” flexible-fuel
vehicles to exploit the flexible-fuel loophole, then marginal consumers in these and other
states are unlikely to value flexible-fuel capacity. Our estimates for the flexible-fuel price
premium are consistent with this hypothesis.
3.4.3 Consumers do not pay extra for flexible-fuel capacity
Given that automakers sell a large fraction of flexible-fuel vehicles to consumers who
lack access to ethanol, one would expect the equilibrium price of flexible-fuel capacity to
be zero. In the presence of market power or price discrimination, however, consumers in
states with ethanol availability, such as Minnesota, might pay a premium, even if marginal
consumers in other states do not. We compare the prices of vehicles with and without
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flexible-fuel capacity and find that their prices are not statistically different.
Anecdotal evidence from media reports and from a report by several federal agencies
suggests that automakers sometimes increased the manufacturer’s suggested retail price
(MSRP) for flexible-fuel vehicles, but then netted-out these price increases with targeted
rebates (U.S. Department of Transportation et al. 2002). In other media reports, automak-
ers claim that the cost of flexible-fuel capacity is not passed on to consumers (Kohn 2000;
Williams 2008). We checked the MSRP of several flexible-fuel vehicles in May 2008
and found that list prices were the same as comparable gasoline-only vehicles. We exam-
ine whether or not transaction prices and list prices vary with fuel type using our vehicle
transaction data.
We estimate the price premium for flexible-fuel vehicles using the following economet-
ric specification:
(3.12) pi jst = 'FFVi jst +( jst + *i jst ,
where: pi jst is the sales price that we observe in transaction i for vehicle type j in state s
and in month t; FFVi jst is a dummy variable that equals one if the vehicle in the transaction
is a flexible-fuel vehicle and zero otherwise; ( jst is a vehicle-state-month fixed effect; and
*i jst is an error term. We estimate the model using least-squares estimation and vehicle-
state-month fixed effects.
The coefficient of interest is '. This coefficient is the average price premium for
flexible-fuel vehicles relative to comparable gasoline-only vehicles sold in the same place
at the same time. This coefficient measures the marginal willingness to pay for flexible-
fuel capacity. We identify this parameter based on the difference in price between flexible-
fuel vehicles and gasoline-only vehicles that are identical based on other observable char-
acteristics.19 Estimating implicit prices for a vehicle’s fuel type or mileage can be chal-
19These characteristics include make, model, model year, trim level, engine displacement, cylinders, body style, number of doors,
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lenging, given the strong collinearity these characteristics usually share with other at-
tributes (see Espey and Nair (2005)). This is not a problem here. Because we observe
thousands of transactions for flexible-fuel models and their identical gasoline-only coun-
terparts, we are able to control for vehicle attributes non-parametrically using vehicle-
specific fixed effects and still estimate flexible-fuel premiums precisely. Most previous
studies use annual cross-sectional data for vehicle list prices and control for vehicle at-
tributes parametrically.
Our transaction-level microdata also allow us to control flexibly for a vast number of
potentially confounding variables. The vehicle-state-month fixed effects given by ( jst are
equivalent to including vehicle, state, and month dummy variables, as well as all relevant
two-way and three-way interactions of these variables. These controls eliminate nearly all
sources of confounding variation one could imagine.
The error term *i jst reflects unobserved vehicle characteristics such as carpet floor mats,
tinted windows, or other options that do not come standard in observed trim levels. The
error term also reflects transaction-level variation in final sales price, deriving for example
from differences in negotiating skill across dealers and buyers. The identification assump-
tion is that this error term is uncorrelated with flexible-fuel capacity, conditional on state,
month, and vehicle type: E[*i jst · FFVj|( jst ] = 0. If unobserved vehicle characteristics or
other determinants of prices are correlated with flexible-fuel capacity, then least-squares
estimates of the flexible-fuel premium ' will be biased.
Table 3.6 presents the estimation results for the model in equation (3.12). The coeffi-
cient in regression (1) indicates that the marginal consumer demands a $22 price discount
to purchase a flexible-fuel vehicle during the sample period, although this coefficient is
not statistically different from zero.20 When we restrict the analysis to cash transactions
drive type, transmission type, aspiration (e.g., turbo-charged), and truncated VINs excluding flexible-fuel identifiers.
20These results are consistent with earlier work by Liu (2007), who estimates flexible-fuel premiums using annual nationwide data
for suggested retail prices from 1996–2001. She estimates a premium of $0.37.
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FFV -22.07 -38.13 154.21
(28.29) (60.19) (42.85)
observations 665887 143869 249706
groups 99398 52264 55249
R-squared (within) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Dependent variable in regression (1)–(2) is sales price net of manufacturer rebates, fi-
nancing incentives, and trade-in overallowance. Regression (2) estimates the model using
transactions where the purchaser paid cash at the dealer (i.e., did not borrow or lease from
the dealer), so financing incentives do not apply. Dependent variable in regression (3) is is the
manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP). All regressions control for vehicle-state-month
fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by vehicle-state-month cells. See
text for further details.
in regression (2) the flexible-fuel premium falls slightly to −$38 but is statistically in-
distinguishable from the estimate in regression (1). These results suggest that neither
dealer-financed sales nor our adjustment for financing incentives change the estimates ap-
preciably.
Some sources indicate that list prices include a flexible-fuel premium, while other
sources indicate they do not. Table 3.6 shows that MSRPs are about $150 dollars higher for
flexible-fuel vehicles in our sample. Assuming that automakers do not include a flexible-
fuel premium in list prices, then this coefficient would imply that flexible-fuel capacity is
correlated with unobserved options packages that consumers value. The flexible-fuel pre-
mium of −$22 we estimate in regression (1) would be biased upward. That is, consumers
would require an even larger discount to purchase flexible-fuel vehicles than what we
estimate. Because incremental production costs reportedly range from $100–$200, how-
ever, the $154 premium is also consistent with anecdotal evidence that some automakers
raised MSRPs for flexible-fuel vehicles but rebated the difference. This would explain
why MSRPs are higher for flexible-fuel vehicles (regression 3), while transaction prices
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Table 3.7: Are flexible-fuel transactions different?





















FFV -29.43 -0.011 -0.03 46.81 0.03 -0.17 -0.0002 -19.13 0.15 -0.001
(1.07) (0.003) (0.03) (50.34) (1.08) (0.08) (0.0030) (21.07) (0.08) (0.003)
obs. 644291 576274 427656 432137 427656 427656 665887 341293 580964 596987
grps. 97097 95135 79231 79731 79231 79231 99398 75134 90386 94463
R-sq. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Dependent variables are: (1) days that vehicle was in dealer’s inventory prior to sale (2) indicator variable that equals one if buyer
took out loan from dealer and zero if buyer purchased vehicle with cash; (3) APR interest rate conditional on loan from dealer; (4) down
payment conditional on loan from dealer; (5) monthly payment conditional on loan from dealer; (6) loan term in months conditional on
loan from dealer (7) indicator that equals one if buyer sold dealer a trade-in vehicle at time of purchase and zero otherwise; (8) trade-in
amount minus trade-in market value conditional on trade-in vehicle; (9) age of first buyer listed on purchase agreement; (10) indictor
variable that equals one if first buyer listed is female and zero otherwise. All regressions include vehicle-state-month fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by vehicle-state-month cells. See text for details.
are not (regressions 1–2). We are hesitant to read too deeply into this difference, however,
as it is likely the product of sample selection. When we limit our analysis to the MSRP
sample, transaction prices are $121 higher for flexible-fuel vehicles.
If consumers had specific preferences for flexible-fuel vehicles, we would expect these
preferences to correlate with consumer characteristics, such as age or income. This would
lead to sorting on flexible-fuel capacity. Similarly, if automakers installed flexible-fuel
capacity on models with low-value or high-value options packages, these packages would
correlate with consumer characteristics, which would also lead to sorting. Our data allow
us to test this hypothesis. Using the same econometric specification as in equation (3.12)
above, we estimate the correlation between flexible-fuel capacity and other transaction
characteristics. Sallee (2007) uses a similar approach to test whether the typical Prius
buyer who purchased her vehicle when tax incentives were available is different from the
typical buyer who purchased his vehicle when incentives were not available.
Table 3.7 presents the results of these regressions. The first regression indicates that
flexible-fuel vehicles sold 29 days earlier than comparable gasoline-only vehicles sold at
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the same time in the same state. This is a fairly sizable difference given that vehicles
in our sample remain in a dealer’s inventory an average of 73 days. There are several
plausible explanations. First, flexible-fuel capacity may be correlated with other desirable
vehicle options that we do not observe. This seems unlikely, given that we find a zero
price premium for flexible-fuel vehicles on average. Second, flexible-fuel vehicles may go
disproportionately to dealers with high turnover. Finally, flexible-fuel vehicles may spend
fewer days in inventory if some consumers specifically request flexible-fuel vehicles. As
long as these consumers are not marginal they could increase turnover without affecting
prices.
None of the other transaction characteristics differ between flexible-fuel and gasoline-
only vehicles. Flexible-fuel buyers are no more or less likely to finance their vehicles
through dealers. Interest rates are no different for flexible-fuel buyers, nor are down pay-
ments, monthly payments, or loan durations. Flexible-fuel and gasoline-only buyers trade
in used vehicles just as often, and trade-in balances do not differ systematically. Finally,
flexible-fuel and gasoline-only buyers are the same age and gender on average. In sum-
mary, we detect no observable differences between car buyers that purchase flexible-fuel
vehicles and those that buy identical gasoline-only vehicles. Flexible-fuel vehicles spend
fewer days in inventory, however, which is consistent with some buyers having specific
preferences for flexible-fuel capacity. These buyers do not affect prices.
Overall, our analysis of prices and quantities suggests that automakers do not charge
more for flexible-fuel vehicles, and, more specifically, that the marginal consumer does
not value flexible-fuel capacity. This justifies the formulation of our model, which im-
plicitly assumes that consumers ignore flexible-fuel capacity. When combined with the
evidence we present above that automakers exploit the flexible-fuel loophole to comply
with CAFE standards, install flexible-fuel capacity on some but not all units, and do not
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exhaust the flexible-fuel loophole, we have shown that the four conditions we need to pin
down marginal compliance costs actually hold.
3.5 Estimating marginal compliance costs
Using our methodology, we now calculate marginal compliance costs for automakers
that produced flexible-fuel vehicles. Equation (3.7) from above, which we repeat here for
convenience, shows that the cost per vehicle of marginally increasing the CAFE standard






=− % · m
.2(1−&) ,
where % is the incremental cost of adding flexible-fuel capacity, m is actual fuel economy,
. is the nominal fuel-economy standard, and & is the AMFA incentive for flexible-fuel
vehicles. Again, this result assumes that the backstop constraint on actual mileage is not
binding. In theory, this equality holds separately for all models whose flexible-fuel shares
are greater than zero and less than one. As we show above, however, an automaker will
typically only have one model with an interior flexible-fuel share, both in theory and in
practice.
We calculate marginal compliance costs by plugging in parameter values as follows.
While we do not observe the incremental cost of adding flexible-fuel capacity to partic-
ular models, reports from various sources put these costs at anywhere from $25–$300
per vehicle.21 We use a range of $100–$200 per vehicle, which we think gives a conser-
vatively high estimate of incremental costs. We calculate relevant mileage as the sales-
weighted harmonic-average mileage of an automaker’s flexible-fuel vehicles. We assume,
21Reliable sources put costs as high as $150–$300 per vehicle before automakers began producing flexible-fuel vehicles in large
quantities (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1990) to as low as $25–$50 currently (Alson 2008), while NHTSA put the range
at $100–$200 when it ruled to extend the flexible-fuel provision in 2004 (U.S. Department of Transportation 2004). Recent reports in
the popular press quoting automakers themselves are consistent with these ranges, with costs ranging from “$70 to $100 per vehicle,
depending on engine size” (Williams 2008), to “at most a few hundred dollars more per car” (Barrionuevo and Maynard 2006). Some
sources report costs at “high sales volumes,” implying that some cost estimates include average fixed costs. Rubin and Leiby (2000)
cite a consulting report from 1995 that estimated fixed costs of $4.2 million per model annually and incremental production costs of
$240 per vehicle.
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General Motors $11–$22 $9–$18
Nissan $11–$21
CAFE fine $55 $55
Jacobson (2007) $11–$23 $4–$36
Note: Table shows estimates of marginal compliance costs based on equation (3.13). Ranges as-
sume an incremental cost of $100–$200 for adding flexible-fuel capacity. Calculations use the sales-
weighted mean fuel-economy standard for each automaker and the sales-weighted mileage for each
automaker’s flexible-fuel vehicles during 1993–2006. Estimate for the General Motors passenger-car
fleet assumes that GM applied flexible-fuel capacity to a car of average mileage when it began produc-
ing flexible-fuel vehicles in 2007. Ford and General Motors exhausted the flexible-fuel loophole for
their light-truck fleets in 2003–2004, so marginal compliance costs in at least those years are higher
than what we estimate here. Chrylser pays fines on its import passenger-car fleet; costs based on our
methodology are for domestic fleet only. Firms that serially pay fines have marginal cost equal to
CAFE fine of $55. Table also includes Jacobson (2007) estimates for comparison.
as above, that the flexible-fuel incentive is & = 0.6. Finally, while the standard for pas-
senger cars remains 27.5 miles per gallon during the entire study period, the light-truck
standard increases gradually from 20.4–21.6 miles per gallon. We therefore calculate the
sales-weighted harmonic-average standard for each automaker. We calculate costs sepa-
rately for light-truck and passenger-car fleets.
Table 3.8 presents our estimates of marginal compliance costs for automakers that pro-
duce flexible-fuel vehicles. Tightening the light-truck standard by one mile per gallon
would cost these automakers at most $11–$28 in lost profit per vehicle, while tightening
the standard for passenger cars would cost at most $8–$18 per vehicle. The ranges for each
automaker derive from the assumed range of $100–$200 for incremental production costs.
Costs are not identical because the mileage of flexible-fuel vehicles varies from automaker
to automaker, as does the average light-truck standard. We do not calculate compliance
costs on a year-by-year basis, because banking and borrowing provisions allow automak-
ers to equate marginal compliance costs over time.
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Again, because the automaker is optimizing on the margin, these costs equal the marginal
cost of improving AMFA fuel economy using flexible-fuel vehicles, as well as the marginal
cost of improving AMFA fuel economy through other means. Recall that while AMFA
fuel economy is not equivalent to actual fuel economy, the two are quite close in practice.
Our estimates therefore reflect lower profit margins on smaller, more efficient vehicles,
as well as the difference between production costs and willingness to pay for marginal
improvements in vehicle efficiency.
Costs are substantially lower than the $55 fine that automakers pay when they are out of
compliance, which previous researchers use as a measure of compliance costs. Thus, were
it not for fixed engineering costs, European automakers could reduce compliance costs by
producing flexible-fuel vehicles.
Nissan first produced flexible-fuel trucks in 2005–2006, revealing marginal compliance
costs for at least those years. General Motors first began producing flexible-fuel cars in
the 2007 model year. Assuming that the passenger-car standard is binding for General
Motors toward the end of the study period, and that General Motors applied flexible-fuel
capacity to cars with average mileage, then our methodology implies that GM’s marginal
cost of compliance is $9–$18 per vehicle. Marginal costs for these automakers were as
low as zero in earlier years when their fuel economy exceeded the standard and they did
not produce flexible-fuel vehicles.
For constrained automakers that exhaust the flexible-fuel loophole, we are able to
estimate lower bounds for marginal compliance costs. Ford and General Motors both
exhausted the flexible-fuel loophole for their light-truck fleets in 2003–2004, so their
marginal costs are probably higher than the estimates in table 3.8 for at least those years.
Their costs are bounded from above by the $55 penalty for non-compliance, ignoring any
implicit fixed cost for non-compliance. Marginal compliance costs are zero for uncon-
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strained automakers, such as Honda and Toyota. Marginal compliance costs are $55 per
vehicle for automakers that serially pay fines, including Volkswagen and Porsche.
Jacobson (2007) estimates marginal compliance costs for domestic automakers during
1997–2001 using a wholly different methodology based on estimated demand elastici-
ties and implied markups.22 He finds that tightening the fuel-economy standard for light
trucks by one mile per gallon would cost domestic automakers $11–$23 per vehicle, de-
pending on the automaker, while tightening the standard for passenger cars would cost
$4–$36. These estimates are very close to what we estimate based on incremental costs
for flexible-fuel vehicles. This is precisely what theory would predict, given that most do-
mestic automakers produced flexible-fuel vehicles during 1997–2001. We find this overlap
reassuring.
Our cost estimates nevertheless have several limitations. First, like other estimates in
this literature, our estimates only reflect the cost of marginal increases in CAFE standards.
They do not reflect engineering investments, capital expenditures, and other fixed costs
that may be required for aggressive increases in mileage. These costs could be substantial.
Second, our estimates reflect compliance costs during our study period and do not neces-
sarily hold for current or future years. Vehicle characteristics, consumer preferences, and
technology evolve over time. Moreover, the structure of CAFE regulation is currently in
flux, as regulators move toward “size-based” standards, which mandate higher mileage for
firms that produce smaller vehicles. These reforms will undoubtedly impact compliance
costs. Finally, our estimates do not reflect changes in consumer surplus resulting from
tighter fuel-economy standards.
To put our cost estimates in context, we provide back of the envelope calculations for
22He estimates a system of demand elasticities for new vehicles, assumes that oligopolistic automakers engage in Nash-Bertrand
pricing behavior, and then solves each automaker’s system of first-order conditions to impute marginal costs. He then assumes that the
share of a model’s markup that goes to dealers is constant across an automaker’s models. This is his key identification assumption. He
is then able to regress observed dealer markups over invoice on imputed costs and fuel consumption for each model. The estimated
parameter on fuel consumption yields the shadow value of the fuel-economy constraint.
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the marginal external benefits of tighter fuel-economy standards assuming that automakers
are forced to comply by improving actual fuel economy. Tighter fuel-economy standards
reduce U.S. gasoline consumption, which lowers world oil prices, mitigates adjustment
costs associated with oil price shocks, and reduces carbon dioxide emissions. Tighter
standards reduce the cost of traveling a mile, however, which leads to increased travel
and offsetting externalities, including noise, congestion, and traffic accidents. Net benefits
are therefore highly sensitive to the elasticity of miles with respect to mileage. Gener-
ous assumptions would put benefits at roughly $0.30 per gallon, costs at $0.10 per mile
(Harrington et al. 2007), and the elasticity response at 0.1 (Small and Dender 2007). As-
suming that the average truck travels 190,000 miles in its lifetime, the external benefit
for light trucks is $23 per vehicle. The external benefit for cars is −$1, assuming a car
travels 160,000 miles.23 We are unable to perform a formal benefit-cost test, as our cost
estimates do not include changes in consumer surplus. Jacobson (2007) finds that con-
sumers bear over 80% of the welfare loss of tighter standards, however, which suggests
that fuel-economy standards are unlikely to pass a benefit-cost criterion, even though the
cost to producers is small.
23We obtain information on average lifetime miles weighted by survival rates from the U.S. Department of Transportation (2008).










where $E/$. is the marginal externality, b is the marginal external benefit of reducing gasoline consumption, k is the marginal external
cost of increasing miles traveled, . is the fuel-economy standard, M is miles traveled, and # is the elasticity of miles with respect to




In chapter II of this dissertation, I develop a model that explicitly links the distribution
of household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute to aggregate price responses.
The model allows me to extract information about micro-preferences from aggregate data
on ethanol quantities and relative fuel prices. I do not need to observe gasoline quantities,
as in other methodologies that match predicted and observed market shares. I estimate
the model using data for ethanol sales volumes and relative fuel prices at a large number
of retail fueling stations. I use a semi-parametric approach and other methods to estimate
elasticities flexibly as a function of relative fuel prices, thereby revealing the distribution
of household preferences for ethanol. Future research could apply this model and method-
ology to estimate preferences for other goods with perfect subsitutes.
I find that demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute is sensitive to relative fuel prices,
with elasticities that range from 2.5–3.0. Price responses are considerably smaller and less
variable than they would be if household preferences for ethanol as a gasoline substitute
were nearly identical. Fuel-switching behavior extends over a wide range of relative prices,
and demand is not especially responsive to price changes at any particular point. These
results imply that preferences are heterogeneous. Some households require that ethanol
be discounted heavily relative to gasoline, while others require smaller discounts or may
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even be willing to pay a premium for ethanol.
These results have important implications for policy analysis. Accounting for hetero-
geneity cuts the cost of a national ethanol content standard in half. While the average
household may require a large subsidy before choosing ethanol, households with strong
preferences switch to ethanol with minimal price distortion. Similar intuition likely ap-
plies for policies that promote higher market shares for other “green” substitutes, such as
renewable electricity, energy-efficient lighting and appliances, hybrid vehicles, or organic
foods. Researchers should focus on marginal households when assessing the impacts of
policy; assuming mean preferences for all households can yield misleading results.
The ethanol content standard nevertheless remains a costly policy. Costs per gallon of
gasoline saved or ton of carbon emissions avoided exceed most conventional estimates of
marginal external damages by a wide margin. Even after revising the analysis in ethanol’s
favor, the ethanol content standard can not be justified on efficiency grounds. If land-
use changes associated with growing feedstocks negate ethanol’s climate benefits, then
the policy actually increases greenhouse emissions. Policymakers should seek to regulate
emissions or tax externalities directly, as the ethanol content standard is likely to do more
harm than good.
In chapter III of this dissertation, my coauthor and I analyze the market for flexible-fuel
vehicles that burn ethanol. While interesting in its own right, this market indirectly pro-
vides information about the cost of tightening fuel-economy standards. Efforts to reduce
gasoline consumption in the United States largely focus on mandating vehicle efficiency
through Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. The merits of these stan-
dards are not always clear, in part because it is difficult to measure the cost of regulation
in the absence of market prices and because automakers have an incentive to overstate
the costs of compliance. Domestic automakers claim that aggressive increases in CAFE
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standards would cost them tens-of-billions of dollars in profit, force them to close plants
and cut tens-of-thousands of jobs, increase car prices by thousands of dollars, and “crip-
ple” the domestic auto industry (Byrne 2003; Bloomberg News 2007; Shepardson 2007).
Automakers do not publicly state net compliance costs in terms that we estimate here, but
they always claim that the costs are high.
We estimate the cost of marginally tightening CAFE standards as revealed by profit-
maximizing behavior in the auto industry. We demonstrate that automakers exploit an
incentive or “loophole” in CAFE regulation that allows them to relax CAFE standards by
producing flexible-fuel vehicles. We show theoretically that constrained automakers will
equate the marginal cost of improving fuel economy using flexible-fuel vehicles with the
marginal cost of improving fuel economy through other means. Thus, because we can
observe the cost of producing a flexible-fuel vehicle, automakers that produce flexible-
fuel vehicles indirectly reveal their marginal compliance costs. Based on this approach,
we estimate that tightening CAFE standards by one mile per gallon would cost domestic
automakers at most $10–$30 in profit per vehicle. Our estimate is similar to another recent
estimate in the literature, which was obtained using alternative methods.
The CAFE standards program is an important policy in a high-profile industry. Recent
legislation has scheduled significant increases in CAFE standards for the coming decades,
and policymakers are likely to pursue further increases in vehicle efficiency, given that the
personal transportation sector accounts for a large share of petroleum consumption and
greenhouse gas emissions. The standards are politically controversial, however, because
domestic automakers are perceived as less capable of producing efficient vehicles than
their Japanese counterparts. Research that reliably quantifies the cost of CAFE regulation
is therefore important. Our estimates for marginal compliance costs directly address this
research need. Future research can use our estimates and approach when estimating com-
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pliance costs and comparing CAFE to alternative policies, such as an increase in the tax
on gasoline.
Our methodology may also prove useful for researchers investigating the costs of reg-
ulation in other industries. For example, “incentive zoning” laws in some cities allow
developers to relax height and density restrictions on new structures by setting aside open
space or providing other public goods. Researchers could infer the benefits of relaxing
zoning restrictions by observing how much developers spend on public goods to relax
these restrictions. In addition, when government budgets become tight, and funding for
direct provision of public goods becomes scarce, policymakers may seek to create in-
centives for public goods in other areas by modifying existing regulations. Firms that
use these incentives may reveal information about compliance costs. Finally, energy and
environmental regulation is likely to increase significantly in the coming decades, as pol-
icymakers around the world grapple with climate change. We suspect that some of these
regulations will feature incentives and loopholes like the one we use here to uncover CAFE
compliance costs.
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